

Kondylis Panajotis, »Zur geistigen Struktur der utopischen Konstruktionen des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts«, in DZPhil (= Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie = German Journal (Periodical) for Philosophy), Berlin 51 (2003) 2, 299-310 [[Translated from the German by C.F., ©, January-February, 2019]]

On (Regarding, In relation to) the intellectual(- spiritual) structure of (the) utopian constructions of the 16th and 17th century

By PANAJOTIS (PANAGIOTIS) KONDYLLIS

Contents

Introduction

- I. The presuppositions pertaining to the history of ideas
- II. Contrast, opposition, and, agreement between “optimism” and “pessimism”
- III. The depiction (description, portrayal, representation) of the utopian state
- IV. The intellectual(-spiritual) structure of Utopia (utopia)

Introduction

In comparison to the critique (criticism) of ideology, the critique/criticism of Utopia exhibits (shows, features) a certain backwardness (retardedness, retardation). The critique of ideology basically established a connection and link with (to) (or: connected to/linked with) Marxist social critique (criticism)

(critique of society/the social), and was aimed at founding and justifying (giving reasons for) its (Marxism's) social-political and social-theoretical claims.¹ The critique (criticism) of Utopia, in so far as it was undertaken on the part of Marxism, had (has) above all the intention of unmasking (uncovering, exposing, debunking) preceding (i.e. of the past/yesteryear) or contemporary plans (blueprints, sketches) in respect of an ideal societal (social) construction as [[being]] idealistic and not realisable, since they (the said utopian plans) did not take into account (consider) the real, law-bound (deterministic, law(rule)-based) course of History (history): in such a way, the scientificity (or scientificity, i.e. the (purported) scientific nature) of Marxism was highlighted (emphasised, stressed) all the more. To "orthodox Marxism", it sufficed for Utopia to be called (or: it was sufficient that Utopia be labelled/described as) a pre-scientific intellectual(-spiritual) stance. Marxism endeavoured, in part rightly, and with success, to point out (show, demonstrate) its own scientificity (or scientificity, i.e. (purported) scientific nature) in the analysis of capitalistic society, above all in the critique (criticism) of its (capitalistic society's) ideological veiling (disguising, covering up). But the critical impulse of a social theory can (irrespective of its scientific value (worth)) be utopian, because in a certain sense, a consistent critique of Utopia would be the self-critique of the critique of ideology (ideological criticism). Militant Marxism, at the very least, did not undertake this self-critique – not least of all because its own force and social-political effectivity (effectiveness) would have been damaged (harmed) if it itself had been relativised by such a critique (criticism).

(ALL FOOTNOTES ARE BY THE TRANSLATOR AND HAVE ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.!!!)

¹ (ALL FOOTNOTES ARE BY THE TRANSLATOR AND HAVE ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.!!!): So, Marxism (not "cultural Marxism") but Marxism up to and including Marxism-Leninism, succeeded in making innumerable valid points about Liberalism-Capitalism-Imperialism, but was never able (because it was an ideology itself) "to do a Karl Mannheim" to itself and critique itself as to its own ideological (unachievable, normative) elements.

Whereas (Whilst) the living and spirited (vital, lively) stimulus (stimulation) of (the) Marxist critique of ideology (ideological criticism) was the struggle against capitalistic society, the incessant, unremitting stimulus (stimulation) of the conservative critique of Utopia consisted (existed) in the (its (the conservative critique of Utopia's)) defence against Marxism and socialism. The critique of Utopia of this school or line of thought (i.e. of conservatism against Marxism and socialism) rejected every, in principle, distinction between Marxism and utopian thought (thinking), and attempted (tried) to show the non-realizability of the modern communistic ideal by pointing to the absurdity of the content of the novels/romances in respect of the state (state novels)² (Mohl, Stammler, and others). The newer (i.e. more recent) conservative³ critique of Utopia has, after the experiences of totalitarianism of (in) the 20th century, taken another path, and tries (attempts) to make clear the connection between Utopia and totalitarianism: Utopia contains the core of totalitarianism, whose (i.e. Utopia's) (sudden or abrupt) change into totalitarianism is unavoidable. It is

² (ALL FOOTNOTES ARE BY THE TRANSLATOR AND HAVE ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.!!!): “Der Staatsroman ist ein literarisches Genre, bei dem in Romanform eine fiktionale, typischerweise vollkommener oder ideale Gesellschaft und ihre Staatsform thematisiert wird. Ein Staatsroman greift dabei eine gesellschaftliche Utopie auf oder entwickelt eine solche. Ab dem 20. Jahrhundert treten an die Stelle von Utopien auch gegenteilige Entwürfe, die Mätopien. Ein Beispiel für den Staatsroman der Neuzeit ist Utopia von Thomas Morus. Eine wichtige Rolle für das Genre spielt die literarische Verarbeitung der Aufklärung. Staatsromane der Aufklärung beschreiben eine Vervollkommnung des Zusammenlebens auf der Ebene des Staates und handeln vom kosmopolitischen Menschen” (<https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Staatsroman>) (= (C.F.'s translation): “The state novel/romance is a literary genre in which, in the form of a novel or romance, a fictional, typically more perfect or ideal society and its form of state or government, is thematised, i.e. made the topic of literary presentation (and generally is put under examination). A state novel/romance takes (or picks) up, in the course of this, a societal Utopia [[as its theme or topic]] or develops such a societal Utopia [[as its topic or theme]]. From the 20th century, contrary or opposite plans (blueprints, sketches), Dystopias (Kakotopias, Anti-Utopias and Mätopien), stepped into (i.e. took) the place of Utopias. An example of a state novel/romance of the New Times is *Utopia* by Thomas More. The literary working on and processing of the Enlightenment played an important role for the genre. State novels/romances of the Enlightenment describe a perfecting of living together and co-existence at the level of the state, and are about cosmopolitan man” [[obviously, “cosmopolitan” has nothing to do with today's notion of the jet-set, hedonistic consumer, but of a very learned and educated, cultured man versed in his own language and culture, but also in other languages and cultures usually of (advanced) Western Europe]]).

³ (ALL FOOTNOTES ARE BY THE TRANSLATOR AND HAVE ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.!!!): See, P.K. was practical. The point of this article is not to go into a historical-scientific conceptual analysis of “conservatism”, but for P.K. to make himself understood about the topic of Utopia in the history of ideas, so he uses “conservative” here in the way most people used it ideologically in Germany at the time of writing this article (i.e. more or less in line with mixed (confused) notions of liberalism and mass democracy). I cannot find out when this article was actually written, but I would “reasonably” guess that if it were written before his book *Konservativismus* (1986) – more likely in the 1980s rather than in the 1970s, he would have already had in mind the main theses of his future scientific exposition of the concept of conservatism.

worth mentioning (remarking) that certain thinkers standing near, i.e. close, to Marxism (e.g. Bloch), have in actual fact accepted an important point of conservative critique, by, namely, recognising that Utopia, in the sense of the “age-old/primordial dream of The Land of Milk and Honey”, constitutes a common feature of the revolutionary movement of all times (eras, epochs, ages). Other attempts at an investigation of the psychological and social-historical constituent elements (parts) of Utopia have remained fragmentary, although their value (worth) is unmistakable.

The intention of this work is that – through the analysis of the concrete content as regards the history of ideas of concrete Utopias –, for the logical form and the historical function of these Utopias in respect of an epoch of social transition, to be investigated. Of central importance, a double (dual, twin) task appears here: 1. The comparison of the world view and of the view of history of the most important Utopias to those of [[at that time]] contemporary and consciously anti-utopian thought (thinking) (Machiavelli, Hobbes). What are the points of contact and the differences between the “optimistic” and the “pessimistic” tradition? 2. The analysis of the logical and psychological content of Utopias. Are there varying, different or even heterogeneous strata (layers) in their structure? To what is every one of these strata to be put down to and reduced? What is the fate (destiny) of the heterogeneous elements which co-exist in the final form of Utopias known to us, and from which (what) process did this form emerge? What does the fate (destiny) of the elements of the structure of Utopia signify in relation to the fate (destiny) of the main bearers of every one of these elements?

I. The presuppositions pertaining to the history of ideas

At the centre (mid-point) (heart) of the intellectual(-spiritual) world of Utopias, stand, i.e. are, ideas and views which represent the points of reference of the

dominant (ruling) thought style of the 16th and 17th century. The utopist (utopian) distances himself from the phenomena which he takes into account, he carves (cuts) up and dismembers the (what is) existing into individual parts (pieces), and selects (chooses) some of the same (individual parts), in order to put them in order, i.e. classify and or place (incorporate), them (with)in another structure, construction or edifice, which is also dominated (ruled, commanded) by an entirely different spirit(-intellect) and goal (end or purpose). He rejects social reality as a whole, but he seeks at the same time its bases (centres, strongholds, fulcra) and usable elements (e.g. science), which could play a positive role in the social structure to be realised [[translator's addition: supposedly as a Utopia]]. He reserves for himself the role of leading (managing, ruling) Reason and that (role) of the organiser. This stance is typical for the way of thinking (mode of thought) of the 16th and 17th century. The view of the Renaissance sees in the state (polity, country, nation, colony; im Staate), a work of art (or: sees the state as an artwork); social-political reality constitutes in itself (a) chaotic stuff, i.e. chaotic matter or material (subject, topic) into which Reason must intervene (interfere, engage, mesh) in order to give it (social-political reality) a(n) purposeful (functional, expedient, useful, end(goal)-oriented) (well-)balanced/adjusted (even, consistent) form. In (the) Italy of the 15th and 16th century, one assumed that unceasing (incessant) social-political difficulties can be put aside or eliminated by (means/way of) (through) a (the) construction of a rational (reasonable) constitution (polity), a constitution/polity, which results from the correct (right) reckoning, i.e. calculation (estimation, evaluation), of all factors and humours (i.e., tempers, spirits, moods, morales and dispositions) ("umori"). The statesman and theoretician/theorist of the state takes, vis-à-vis the state, the stance or attitude of the artist vis-à-vis his (the artist's) [[own]] work (a comparison of the law-giver, i.e. lawmaker and legislator with the sculptor is often found in Machiavelli's writings). A(n) oppositeness of, or antagonism (contrariness) between, Reason and stuff (i.e. matter, material), of

(or between) spirit(-intellect) and reality, is strongly (starkly) felt here. It is certain that Reason is not in the situation (position) to develop itself in another area or realm [[other]] than that of this stuff (i.e. matter or material). However, in (regard to) this unavoidable connection, one feels that Reason, as an independent law-giving (lawmaking, i.e. legislative) principle, should be granted (allowed, conceded) priority. Yet, it is still not here a matter of pure Reason. In the remoulding (reshaping, rearrangement, remodelling) of the object on the part of (i.e. by) the subject, heterogeneous psychological elements take part (participate). The role of phantasy (fantasy) is great/large here, which often shapes the general structure of a construction in advance; Reason is later enlisted (called into play, used) to plan this construction more concretely, and to find the means for its realisation. From this point of view, the comparison of the law-giver (lawmaker, legislator) with/to the artist is complete (absolute) and perfect: like the artist, the law-giver (lawmaker, legislator) should also use his whole (entire) psychological capacity (faculties, powers, abilities) to shape and mould the existing and present (available) stuff (i.e. matter or material) purposefully and expediently.

The same priority of the organising subject is found again in the representations and notions of the Cartesian 17th century; here the state is not looked at and regarded as a work of art (an artwork), but rather as a machine. The state appears as an apparatus whose constituent elements (parts) are necessarily and quasi-automatically joined or fitted together, although it is admitted (conceded, granted) that this enormous (tremendous) mechanism is not free of (from) disturbances (disruptions). It goes without saying (is understandable to oneself) that if the conception of the work of art (artwork) is replaced by the conception of the machine, then also the composition or constitution of this artwork-creating and understanding spirit(-intellect) must be changed (altered). The many-layeredness/sidedness (i.e. having many strata) (or

complexity) of the psychological capacity (faculties, powers, abilities) of the Renaissance is put aside, eliminated, and in its place mere Reason [[is put]], which endeavours to carry out the construction or reconstruction of the state *modo geometrico* (= Italian = *in a geometric manner/mode/way*). Although the composition or constitution of the subject is changed (altered), it remains in its priority inviolable (unassailable, untouchable). This development as regards the history of ideas, we can best (at most) follow (pursue, track) in the example of Machiavelli and Hobbes in the area/realm of the science of the state or polity, and (in the example of) Leonardo da Vinci and Descartes in the area and realm of natural science and philosophy. It is noteworthy (worthy of remark) for our putting of the question (examination of the problem, problem examination) that Utopias are the common denominator of (at) all levels of this development, i.e. the belief or faith in the ability of the spirit(-intellect) to construct and to understand all things, to make everything its own, although they (the said Utopias) are at different (varying) stages (tiers, grades, levels) of development when the composition and constitution of this spirit(-intellect) is set as the criterion. The difference in relation to other representations (notions), which belong to the same development as regards the history of ideas, lies in (the fact) that in (regard to) (the) Utopias, the spirit(-intellect) ultimately (at/in the (very) end) serves absolute moral, and not power-political or state-preserving goals (ends, purposes). Here it is seen that the same thought style varies, in fact can unconsciously adapt to opposing conscious intentions. But this fact [[of the aforesaid moral as opposed to power-political and state-preserving goals]] remains, perhaps not without consequences for the historical destiny (fate) of those intentions, which in the course of the struggle as regards their realisation, come into contradiction with the latent tendencies of their thought style.⁴

⁴ (ALL FOOTNOTES ARE BY THE TRANSLATOR AND HAVE ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.!!!): i.e. utopian thinking can contribute to driving (social-political) action, but the Utopia sought is never realised in practice, only ever remaining but a dream.

Through the representation and notion of harmony, the intellectual(-spiritual) world of (the) Utopia is connected with that of (the) modern natural science just coming into being. The utopian *civitas* (= Latin = *city(-state)*, *commonwealth*, *polity*, *town*, *community*) was represented and constituted above all by all great utopists as the deepest harmonic Whole (whole), and indeed it was comprehended (grasped) as the living realisation of world harmony. The harmony emerges or comes out of the rational synthesis of all constituent elements (parts), it (the said harmony) ranges from town/city planning and urban development, up to the institutional regulation of human relations (circumstances, conditions). This harmony coincides, in turn (again), with a world plan (i.e. a plan for the world), it constitutes a part, and at the same time a reflection, of world harmony, which rules over and dominates the macrocosm and the microcosm. This connection with a general world plan offers, above all, Utopia the possibility of providing its members with an ideology, by it (Utopia) ideologising itself. (Thus, in particular with (regard to) Campanella.) We find harmony as the point of integration (linking, combining, association, connection) of all spheres of (the) Being (being) again in Kepler, in whom geometrical bindedness is connected to/with Pythagorean musical law; thereafter, both these sides (of geometrical bindedness and Pythagorean musical law) are grasped/comprehended and enclosed (with)in a fixed numerical formula, [[and]] then the harmony becomes (turns into) an attribute of the spirit(-intellect). The neo-Platonic character (look, impression, (hall)mark, stamp) is in these representations and notions clear, and this further development (or meta-development) of the elements (factors, motives, moments) of late Italian humanism in the framework of the new natural science [[then]] coming into being seems at first (first of all) to be admirable. This further development (or meta-development) is to (can) be explained, on the one hand, from the elasticity of neo-Platonic ideas, which offered new combinatory possibilities (possibilities (in respect) of combination), and on the other hand,

from/out of mistrust in respect of (for) Aristotelianism, which in the eyes of the new natural scientists was connected with the Scholastic world view. What interests us here, above all, is the following: that in the formulation of the utopian emancipatory postulate, a series (i.e. number or range) of ideas and a thought style was used which did not constitute the exclusive (sole) logical consequences of this (utopian emancipatory) postulate, but also the core (nucleus) of other intellectual(-spiritual) endeavours, which by no means had emancipatory intentions in mind.

II. Contrast, opposition, and, agreement between “optimism” and “pessimism”

Often the anthropological foundations of the theories of the state and of society (or: of state(-related) and social theories) are neglected, although precisely these foundations can proffer the theoretical key for the right (correct) understanding of such theories. This fact coincides perhaps with the fact that most of the great social theories only hint at (intimate, imply, suggest, indicate) their anthropology, and allow their anthropology to become evident (come to the fore) indirectly, even if this anthropology is the deciding [[factor]] (or what decides things) in the further development (or meta-development) of (the) theory [[in question, concerned]]. It is a matter ultimately (in the very end) of whether a theory presupposes an – of his nature (i.e. naturally) – evil, or an – of his nature (i.e. naturally) – good, man. It is clear at the outset (from the start/beginning) that a negative anthropology is fully (completely, totally) incompatible with the ideal of the realisation of Utopia. Utopia must inevitably (inescapably) presuppose a good human nature; its (Utopia’s) existence itself has no meaning (makes no sense) if it does not make (express) a confession of faith in man’s natural goodness, or at least in his educability (trainability). The fact that the utopists propose and propound (suggest, put forward) a

restructuring of the foundations of social life, proves that they view (look at (upon)) exactly these foundations, and the influencing of man through these (foundations), but not man and his innate (native) capacity (faculties, powers, abilities), as responsible for social misery (wretchedness, hardship, squalor). It is a different matter [[altogether]] as regards the great representatives of the “pessimistic” tradition. But in (regard to) the instinctive, empirical, from time to time (now and then, occasional) contradictory, anthropology of Machiavelli, as in the Hobbesian geometry of immutable (invariable) human passions, history and social life are a function of the psychical faculties (aptitudes, gifts, (pre)dispositions, tendencies) of man, and not the other way around. Perhaps we could say that the most important, the tone-giving (i.e. setting the tone) faculty, aptitude, (pre)disposition etc. amongst these faculties, aptitudes, (pre)dispositions etc., is the will to power. That does not mean in the least that man remains a wild beast (animal) and is incapable of constituting (forming, developing) (unable to constitute) a society, because the will to power finds its meaning precisely (with)in the framework of a society. The fact that man is always ruled and dominated by the same laid out and invested (installed) in him passions, leads us to assume that there can be no radical break in the history of his society. What is possible, is the switch(ing) (adjustment, rearrangement) of the power-political constellations and the regulation of the constitution (polity) in regard to the “correct” consideration of (or: “correctly” taking into account) (the) human passions; then a social equilibrium (balance, balancing) could result, which wants to maintain (keep up, uphold, preserve) both the state as an organism, as well as serving the citizens as private people [[i.e. with the private aspects of their lives not subject to state interference]]. This is the highest (supreme, paramount) goal (end, purpose) which the “pessimistic” school of social philosophy sets.

This basic (fundamental) distinction between both schools (lines) of thought (tendencies) [[change society so that man’s good nature can flourish (up to utopistically) vs. man’s bad/evil

nature leads to a social equilibrium being sought based on the balance of power and the correlation of forces]], which concerns the anthropological question and problem, is reflected in their (the said two schools/lines of thought's) attitude towards the problem of the state of nature (natural state). This problem is connected in all newer (more recent/modern) social philosophies most tightly with the anthropological question, and hence, also with the question (problem) of the possibilities and of the perspectives of human society; for this reason, the investigation of these questions from this standpoint serves the elucidation of the moral (ethical) foundations, and of the ultimate mainspring (motivating and driving force) of these theories. Because in the dispute (quarrel, wrangle, strife) of the [[just mentioned]] schools, the problem of the state of nature contains and reveals a point of reference (reference point) in respect of all other theoretical differences (distinctions). In the representation and notion of the utopists, the state of nature is the original paradisiacal state (of affairs) (situation) in which mankind (humanity) lived, as evil, which causes social misery (wretchedness, hardship, squalor) (e.g. property (ownership), proprietorship), was still unknown. The exit from (Leaving) this state (of affairs) is similar to the Fall (of Man), whilst the future realisation of Utopia is nothing other than a return to this state, albeit perhaps at a higher level. In this context, it is characteristic (indicative) that some utopists, in relation to that, tended to regard the life of (the) indigenous (natives, local peoples) in the newly discovered lands (countries) as paradisiacal – a presumption which Hobbes (Leviathan, I, 13) expressly rejects. On the other hand, the state of nature appears to the “pessimists” as the state of war of all against all, in which men (humans) live under circumstances (conditions) which do not allow any security and order (e.g. Machiavelli, Discorsi, I, 2). This situation, which threatens one's own existence, forces men (humans, people) to erect (set up or establish) institutions and states; that is why the state in itself is something good, by constituting – regardless of whether it is a state under the rule of law (constitutional state) or not –, the sole possible framework for the

continuation of social life. Through (By means/way of) the state, the state of nature is overcome (surmounted, gotten over) positively; the founding of the state is not the Fall of Man, but the means to which need (distress, hardship, want) itself has pointed, with which mankind (humanity) steps out of (i.e. emerges from) (the) barbarity (barbarism) and (the) insecurity paralysing everything. The dissolution (disintegration, breaking up) of the state is identical to the return to barbarity (barbarism).

Yet the dispute (quarrel, wrangle, controversy, strife) over the state of nature (natural state) is not merely a historical controversy, a discussion on the genesis and the justification of the state and its institutions (of property (ownership) (proprietorship), of the family etc.). Because the image (picture) of the past holds or saves in itself that (image/picture) of the future, in fact it (the past's image) is its (the future's) reversed image (picture). In this way, the dispute over the past turns into a dispute over the future. To the utopist, it is clear that his argumentation loses much of its persuasive (convincing) force if there is no state (of affairs) (situation) in which the natural good of man predominates (prevails). Because then the historical process would not coincide with the degeneration of man through (by means or way of) institutions and the state, but with his (man's) disciplining and cultivation through (by means or way of) the same (institutions and state). On the other hand, when Machiavelli and Hobbes reject the existence of an ideal state of nature (natural state) in the past, in this rejection, the argument implies (i.e. it is implied by the argument) that also in the future the (a) return to this state (of affairs) (situation) is excluded (precluded). The same reasons which, according to these theoreticians (theorists), (have, had) forced men of the past into the establishment (erection or setting up) of the (an) authoritarian society, (are) now (to) become (becoming) the reasons which prevent the establishment (setting up or erection) of a non-authoritarian society in the future.

Although the above-mentioned fundamental (basic) differences (distinctions) seem to preclude (exclude) the existence of points of contact (or common ground) between both ways of thinking (modes of thought), this is not the case. Because both anthropological representations and notions are not expressed in their purity, which would of itself be dictated by a – from the outset – clear and unambiguous social-political practical stance, but are conveyed (imparted) through a whole series (number) of nuances and modifications. Indeed, in the presentation and notion of the utopists, Man (man) is good by nature, however the unfortunate social circumstances (conditions) in which he (Man) lives for centuries, have spoiled or corrupted the healthy and sound foundations of his original character. This means that at the concrete moment of (the) reformatory-utopistic praxis, the do-gooder (world-betterer, improver of the world) is compelled to critically confront men (humans) as factors of (in) the process of historical reshaping (rearrangement), and to take those measures which could first of all neutralise and thereafter extinguish (erase, obliterate, wipe out) the acquired evil human properties (qualities and characteristics). In this manner, (the) reformatory-utopistic effort (endeavour, strain) brings with it an educative (instructional, training, educational) concern and an educative ideal. On the other hand, the “pessimistic” philosopher of the state (polity) (or political philosopher) and statesman is compelled (forced) to put the question of education (upbringing, nurturing, training, bringing-up) at the centre of attention of his theoretical and practical efforts and endeavours, since he, in relation to that, believes that men (humans, people) are evil and they, because of that, must be subject to (a) discipline (cultivation or breeding). According to the perception and view of the great pessimists, mere violence is not sufficient for this (discipline etc.); public education constitutes the necessary supplement. Machiavelli’s hints (clues) as to the meaning of the education and of the morals (morality, ethics) of citizens, and those hints or clues of (by) Hobbes as to the necessity of a politically expedient and purposeful (functional, useful,

end(goal)-oriented) organisation of universities, can leave no doubt in relation to that. Thus, the pessimist is also compelled (forced) in practice to step back from the purity of his initial position, and admit the existence of some educative (educational, training, instructional) elements, or at least the possibility of the channelling of the passions for social-political ends (goals, purposes). Each and every relation(ship) of requisite violence with/vis-à-vis requisite education wavers (fluctuates or varies) commensurately with the general perception and view of the (optimistic or pessimistic) philosopher of the state (or political philosopher) and the concrete goals (ends, purposes) and needs (hardships, troubles) of the historical moment. Hence, it becomes possible that both opposed perceptions/views, whilst following their inner logical consequences, can be subsumed at the very end (ultimately) under the common denominator of the *dictatorship of education* (or *the educative (educational, instructional, training) dictatorship*). That (The fact that) some important utopists were prepared to commission (engage, hire, employ) a prince (ruler) for the realisation of Utopia in an emergency (e.g. Andreä (= Andreae)⁵), or to play the role of this prince himself (Campanella), constitutes in relation to that, (an) indirect but eloquent (piece of) proof (evidence). This logical and practical possibility of the concord or correspondence (consonance, agreement) of anthropological optimism and pessimism in view of the handling (treatment) of, and dealing with, concrete social-political questions, is the most interesting point which results from the investigation (examination, scrutiny, study) of these schools (lines) of thought (tendencies).

⁵ (ALL FOOTNOTES ARE BY THE TRANSLATOR AND HAVE ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.!!!): “Johann Valentin Andreae (1586–1654) [...] writer of devotional literature, preacher, Christian utopian, art collector, naturalist, and member of the *Fruchtbringende Gesellschaft*, represents an imposing figure among theologians of the first half of the seventeenth century.”
(<http://emlo-portal.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/collections/?catalogue=johann-valentin-andreae>)

III. The depiction (description, representation) of the utopian state

The isolated (most insular) geographic situation of the utopic states is not merely to be ascribed (attributed) to the dream-like excitement (dream fever) of the epoch of discoveries; rather, the peculiarity of the geographic situation is tightly connected with the peculiarity of the utopian state's social structure. In this structure, the elements involved are arranged (ordered) so that the whole functions like a gigantic clockwork mechanism (which interrelates with the aforementioned representation and notion of harmony), and should eternally function (work forever), as long as no disruptive (disrupting) factor slips or creeps in, (which reminds one of the conditions which are necessary for the pushing through and implementation (prevailing, predominance) of an experiment). Such a disruptive (disrupting) – to the evenness, balance and stability of the inner political structure – factor, is above all the war against other nations. Machiavelli had already strongly felt the influence of war on the internal political structuring of a (the) state, and tried (attempted) to formulate the constitutional (and polity-related) preconditions (prerequisites) of/for which a state has need so that it can conduct and wage a war successfully. Indeed, utopian states also conduct/wage wars, but their (i.e. such wars waged by utopian states') description and portrayal give the authors (composers, writers) of the Utopias more of an opportunity to set forth and expound the all-round (i.e. above all, technical and moral) superiority of their ideal *Civitates* (= Latin = *States, Cities, City-States, Commonwealths, Polities*), than a(n) occasion (reason, cause) for thoughts (thinking) about the relationship between foreign and domestic policy (external and internal politics). Thus, with the assistance (help) of a favourable geographical position, which does not make (an) intensive military activity essential (necessary, required), one of the most bothersome (annoying, irritating) objections or protests of the pessimists is almost put aside without being answered. This is also the case when there is talk

of another, likewise – for the clock[[work]]-like functioning of Utopia – disruptive (disrupting) factor, namely the population. The utopists propose (suggest, propound) the limitation (restriction) of births, or the emigration of the surplus part of the population, without endeavouring to find the solution to this problem inside the institutions designed (planned, sketched (out)) by (them) themselves. But the fact that they (the utopists) see themselves as compelled and forced to mention and to discuss such problems proves their [[own]] feeling for the danger (risk) to one’s own state-related constructions. (It is interesting, in the course of this, to recall the polemics of Marxism against the theories of Malthus. What concerns us here, though, is not the persuasiveness of the argumentation directed against Malthus, but its (the said anti-Malthusian argumentation’s) ideological motivation).⁶

Whereas, therefore, foreign policy prerequisites and presuppositions – and questions of population – in respect of the utopian state, constitute their (i.e. the utopists’) Achilles heel, the invocation, compared to that, of (or appeal to) these (i.e. foreign policy and population), appears to be the strongest (strong) point (base, basis, fulcrum) of the “pessimistic” perception and view as regards national and state policy (politics). But the main focus (emphasis, stress) (centre of gravity) of utopia lies in its internal-political structure. It would be difficult (hard) to find a single (leading, dominant) principle of this structure around which all the phenomena (or manifestations) (appearances, occurrences) of utopian life revolve. Yet (the) investigation of/into the situation of the individual in his relationship with (towards) the social whole is of particular importance (significance) for our context. In general, the reduction [[in significance]] or disparagement of the former (i.e. the individual) and the emphasis (highlighting, accenting) of the latter (social whole) is the rule in

⁶ (ALL FOOTNOTES ARE BY THE TRANSLATOR AND HAVE ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.!!!): that is to say, utopian thought in the spirit of Progress etc. is capable of coming up with any vision dealing with all kinds of problems which may not have been addressed in previous versions of Utopias, due e.g. to the intervention of mass industrialisation, etc.

Utopias. The independent inner life of the individual is suspicious(-looking) to utopists, because it is linked (tied) to undisciplined passions, which social unity undermines (erodes, wears away); there is no room for (a) personal morality (ethics, morals), or for a force of invention (inventiveness) and of imagination (fantasy, conceit), which would go (out) beyond the boundaries of socially sanctioned morality and ethics. (At the same time, it, in relation to that, is to be remembered that the leveling of all (people) (everyone) vis-à-vis the person of the prince or ruler constitutes the prerequisite (precondition) for the establishment (setting up or erection) of an absolute dictatorship;⁷ this leveling can satisfy the feeling (sense) of equality of the subjects more than e.g. an estate-based (feudal) order, in which only a part of the population is free). The sole field in which the individual can unfold and develop, and distinguish himself from (the) other members of the (his) community, is that of action directed towards the perception of the common good – i.e. at/in the very end (ultimately), again, (directed) towards subjugation (subordination, subjection, submission) to (under) state morals (morality, ethics). Only in this way can the individual gain (earn, obtain, acquire) fame and respect. (Herein the motifs of fame (renown) and of public praise (commendation) adopted (accepted, taken on) from the humanists, which also possess a parallel meaning (significance) in Machiavelli, play a major role.) It is highly (supremely, most) noteworthy that the author (writer) of Utopia, who describes (portrays, depicts) and celebrates such men (people, humans), by considering their (such men's) existence necessary for an ideal social organisation, belongs himself to another kind of human type: he is a passionate dreamer, a man, in regard to (vis-à-vis) whom (i.e. the aforesaid ideal men of Utopia), exactly his critical stance in respect of

⁷ (ALL FOOTNOTES ARE BY THE TRANSLATOR AND HAVE ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.!!!): one could say e.g. that as to the governmental aspects of polity, China today represents a kind of absolute Party dictatorship; Russia, a kind of semi-or-near-absolute oligarchic-mafia dictatorship; and the USA, a kind of looser on the periphery allowing (many) more freedoms in general than China or Russia, but with a tight-grip-like-deep-state-ZIO/JOO-MOB-Gangster-Judas-Satanic core, being a democracy in name, but in practice a mixed separation-of-powers-mass media/brain washing-ZIO/JOO-Mafia-Mob-Satanic-looser-on-the-outside-but-tighter-on-the-ZIO/JOO-Satanic-Mob-Gangster-deep-state-inside dictatorship.

existing society, and his non-adaptation (non-conformity) to it (this existing society), urge and push Utopia to be wished for and to be planned. There is a contradiction between the human type, which preaches (gives a sermon) for/in favour of Utopia, and the human type, whose existence is necessary for the realisation of Utopia. How is the bridging of this gap (chasm) logically possible? Apparently in three ways; namely, through the voluntary (freely willed) renunciation of that individualism necessary for the transition to the utopian state as soon as the society coming into being from the utopian urge (drive, longing, yearning, impulse, thirst) matches, concurs or corresponds (conforms) with the original plans and wishes of men (humans, people); through gradual social education and training (upbringing, instruction), for as long as the psychological leftovers and remnants of the previous (former, preceding) spoiled (corrupt, perverted, depraved) society (including the no longer tolerated revolutionary drive (urge, impulse)) are still strong; and through the dictatorship of education (educational-instructional/training dictatorship), when/if the above-mentioned psychological hindrances (obstacles) are strong and unhoped-for (i.e. unexpectedly powerful/strong), or when/if a part of the people is of the opinion (view) that the (what has been) realised does not match, concur or correspond with the (i.e. what was (had been)) planned.⁸

In the novels/romances in respect of the state (state novels), religion has a pre-eminent and conspicuous (prominent) position. As far as its form is concerned, this religion consists of many and heterogeneous elements, which require a particular (specific) analysis. Here it is only to (should only) be remarked (observed) that, although the most important utopists openly professed (confessed or admitted to) a positive religion, they nonetheless gave the religion of Utopia a form which supposedly combines all the useful constituent elements

⁸ (ALL FOOTNOTES ARE BY THE TRANSLATOR AND HAVE ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.!!!): so, no matter what the regime, those in power, if they want to stay in power (and usually they do!), do whatever is necessary to perpetuate their rule, be it more forcefully-violently, or more or less forcefully through (subtle and or overt forms of) brainwashing etc..

(parts) of religion in general, without [[them (all the useful constituent elements of religion)]] being dogmatically binding, and without [[them]] coming into contradiction with science. On this point, the utopists share the (well-)known stance of the humanists, who looked at/upon (regarded) religion as absolutely necessary for the preservation of the morals (morality, ethics) of the folk (people) and, although they themselves were sceptical, they did not posit (were not) themselves openly against religion. As far as its function is concerned, religion in Utopia fulfils the task (mission) of completing (accomplishing) and consummating (finalising) the leveling of all members of the community before a supreme authority. However, the presence of Utopia in religion also has another meaning, it expresses those ideological and emancipatory tendencies which for centuries took (have/had taken) refuge ((have/had) found sanctuary or shelter) in sectarian thought, and under a host, or enormous number, of religious and superstitious forms, (have/had) attempted to preserve and realise the dream of The Land of Milk and Honey. The echoes, reverberations and repercussions of chiliastic dreams and hopes of sectarianism are still alive (living) in Utopias, although the heyday (prime) of this intricate, complex, broad, widespread and – to us still not completely known – movement, had been over for a long time. For the historical function of the late form of Utopia, worked (hammered) out, drawn up and elaborated upon by the (him who is) educated (cultured) in respect of (his) profession (occupation) (vocationally educated (well-read)), the fact is highly (most) indicative (characteristic, typical) that the original chiliastic dreams, to which Utopia in the final analysis (ultimately) owes its coming into being (genesis, birth), now appear in a modified and varied (changed, transformed) – different from the original – form. The translation of chiliasm into a(n) foreign (alien, strange) – to him (the educated as regards his profession/occupation/vocation) – language, remains not without consequences for his historical fate (destiny), although the translator's express (explicit) and sincere (honest) intent(ion) is only the modernised – with the help of other kinds

of intellectual(-spiritual) means –, and hence ostensibly also more scientific or more thorough (exhaustive, careful, profound, rigorous) formulation of the unprocessed or not-worked-upon, to a certain extent (degree) (in some way) still unclear emancipatory, demands. However, an unavoidable ideologisation of these demands interrelates and is connected with that [[just mentioned process (of an “updated” post-Medieval utopistic chiasm)]]].

The most respected (respectable) intellectual(-spiritual) means for the founding of the realisability of utopian dreams, and at the same time, the most psychically distant (remote) – from these dreams – means, is science, (to) which one invokes (appeals) not only in the novels/romances in respect of the state (state novels), but in all new-times efforts and endeavours for an ideal order of society (or social/societal order). First of all, science serves as a technique (technology) for the satisfaction of human needs; (what these needs are, and whether they can be accurately (precisely, exactly) determined, is a question of anthropology and remains unclear for as long as the anthropological presuppositions (prerequisites) of a social philosophy remain ambiguous). Utopists gladly recount (i.e. narrate, tell of or relate) the strange (odd, peculiar) inventions (fabrications) which served and assisted utopians in order to make their life easier and enjoyable (pleasant, agreeable). In More’s ‘Utopia’, men (people, humans) work daily for six hours, and in Campanella’s ‘Sun-State’ only (for) four (hours), (– which is put down, i.e. due, to the general rationalisation of labour (work) and of human circumstances (conditions and relations) in general, yet this rationalisation itself constitutes a part of the scientific intellect(-spirit), which stimulates new technical inventions). But science is not only the means for the satisfaction of human needs; at the same time and above all, it (science) provides the universal system of knowledge upon which the whole structure of Utopia must rest, so that it (science) can be in line and accord (harmony, unison) with the laws of nature in the widest

(broadest) sense, and participate (take part) in the general plan of creation. That is the ultimate justification of/for Utopia; in such a way (in this way), science becomes theology, which again means that science can replace theology. At a time of an enormous (huge, tremendous) upturn (upswing) of/in science, Utopia (had) set its hopes on science; since, however, Utopia necessarily acquires or appropriates the form of its time(s) (age, era, epoch), the shift (transfer) of its hopes to science means only that in the age (times, era, epoch) of science, Utopia must be “scientific”, irrespective of whether science is objectively in a position to realise utopian wishes (desires) [[or not]].

In the structure of Utopia, therefore, two different strata (layers) clearly differ from each other. On the one hand, chiliastic dreams, which display (exhibit, show, boast) a more or less religious composition (constitution), and on the other hand, the logical construction, which uses rational intellectual(-spiritual) means, which also can belong to the world of imagination (or visionary/imaginative world) of the ruling (dominant, dominating) class, (as is the case with the humanism of the Renaissance). Each of these two elements constitute not only the supplement(ing) (complement) of the other, but also find themselves in an antagonistic relationship as to this (supplementing). The antagonism of ideas is, however, an antagonism of its bearers. The analysis of the logical structure of ideas points to (indicates) the composition and constitution of their (the said ideas’) bearers; and the analysis of the historical function of these bearers points to the historical destiny of ideas.

IV. The intellectual(-spiritual) structure of Utopia (utopia)

The analysis pertaining to the history of ideas in respect of the novels/romances regarding the state (state novels) proves, therefore, the existence of elements in them (such state novels) which are directly linked (fastened, tied on) to the general world image of a given period of time (era, epoch, age). On the other

hand, there are also elements which do not specifically belong in the times (age, era, epoch) of the coming into being (emergence, genesis) of a concrete Utopia, hence, above all, the dream of The Land of Milk and Honey, a dream, whose core (nucleus) is known in all previous epochs of history, and whose negative motif was the rejection of the fundamental (basic) evil of all previous epochs of history. In this particular sense, this latter element (as regards the dream of The Land of Milk and Honey) is not merely (simply) “time-bound”, but generally historical. This double-sidedness of Utopia makes it possible that it (Utopia) can express its form in accordance with time-bound, [[but]] also universal and eternal claims (*or*: it (Utopia) puts into words (given expression to, expresses) universal and eternal claims too, even though its (Utopia’s) form is time-bound (temporally bound)).

The time-bindedness(/binding/attachment) of Utopia results already from the fact that Utopia in particular turns against those elements of reality of its time(s) (age, era, epoch), which it looks at and regards as the root of the existing misery (wretchedness, destitution). That is why the description of the ideal state is carried out (undertaken, executed) in a continual and relentless confrontation and engagement with the present. In such a way, for the most part, the existing (what exists) becomes (turns into) a negative determination or definition of the utopian. On the other hand, however, some basic/fundamental elements of existing reality are negated and lifted (i.e. done away with, abolished, cancelled (out), revoked) not only by Utopia, but also by (means/way of) (through) historical development itself, in which the also non-utopian minded subjects take part (participate); (if Utopia e.g. combats (fights, battles) the current and present certain/particular form of oppression by preaching the abolition of all oppression, then this particular/certain form (of oppression) is combatted (fought) by historical development in such a way (manner) that it (the

oppression being combatted) is replaced by another form of oppression).⁹ In this sense, Utopia is an organic part of historical development and serves its (historical development's) tendencies; (from this standpoint, we could call (name) the utopian construction of the novels/romances in respect of the state (state novels) "bourgeois"). The fact that Utopia is polemical in the confrontation (dispute, altercation, clash) shaped/formed/moulded with regard to its concrete (period of) time(s) (age, era, epoch) has as a consequence that it (Utopia) does not develop (and (let) unfold) its own elements freely and in an unbiassed (impartial, objective) manner (way), (by it (Utopia) for instance taking into consideration (account) solely (exclusively) the general historical and anthropological constants, which supposedly make their (Utopia's own elements) ultimate (final) aim possible). The contradistinction between the utopian state (of affairs) (situation) and the present is not only moral and logical, but also direct and tangible (palpable); utopian institutions are not only comprehended as means for the combatting (fighting) and putting aside and elimination/eliminating (of) the present, (of) the obstacles and hindrances standing in the way of Utopia. Thus, the description (portrayal, depiction) of the end, i.e. final, state (of affairs) (situation) also contains the problem of transition. For that reason, the ideal of education (training, upbringing) – since the ever(-)*present* degeneration of man constitutes, through the ever(-)degenerate present, a great obstacle (hindrance) for/to(wards) the realisation of Utopia – occupies in Utopia, a(n) pre-eminent (outstanding) place (position). From (Based on) the same fact, it is explained why (so) in the description (portrayal, depiction) of an ideal state (of affairs) (situation), which at the same time, is a description (portrayal, depiction) of a period of transition

⁹ (ALL FOOTNOTES ARE BY THE TRANSLATOR AND HAVE ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.!!! **DON'T READ THIS!!!**): so e.g. in particular countries, within a hundred (plus) or so (or less, depending on the situation) years we can go from aggressive racism, discrimination and sexism against blacks, Joos (Satanists, Satanic Circus Monkey people, Zios, The Representatives of Satan, Mammonists) and women, to (increasingly) aggressive racism, discrimination and sexism against white (Christian) males.

(transition(al) period), the idea of a dictatorship of education (educational-instructional/training dictatorship) can be logically tracked down (unearthed, uncovered, smelt (ferreted) out, scented), and also why (so) there is for Utopia the possibility of ideologically perpetuating (immortalising, eternalising) a “period of transition (transition(al) period)”.

For the clarification of the problem of the stratum of the bearers of this intellectual(-spiritual) structure of Utopia, an all-round and subtle analysis of the social and class relations (*or*: of the circumstances as to/(in respect) of society and class) and of the world image of that time(-period) (age, era, epoch) (of those times) is essential (requisite, necessary, required). Here we (shall) confine (restrict, limit) ourselves to some preliminary remarks (comments, observations) about the role of the new-times intelligence newly coming into being. Already the humanists of the Renaissance have the feeling/sense that they constitute a peculiar, special (particular, exceptional) and strange (idiosyncratic, odd, one-of-a-kind) group. Yet their (f)actual dependence on the ruling (dominating, dominant) class is still so great (even though the humanists themselves do not belong to this (ruling) class), that they do not have at their disposal any real possibility of passing themselves off as a free-floating intelligence. Indeed, they are something different (variant) from/to the ruling class, but nevertheless, they are their (the ruling class's) servants and competitors, not (the) potential (possible) allies or leaders of other classes. Admittedly (Mind you), the stance and attitude of the humanists is characterised often by a resentment vis-à-vis (towards) their own masters (rulers, lords), and this reflects the fact that – although the brilliant (splendid, resplendent) world of ideas had been generously and freely left by their (the humanists') masters to the humanists [[themselves]], their (the humanists') situation remained in a social respect (*or*: in social terms) that of a subject (and underling). Now, the utopists are in part (partly) the successors and heirs of the humanists. But for

various historical and sociological reasons, which should (ought to) be (have been) treated in (greater) detail, in general their basic (fundamental) psychological stance or attitude is quite different. The utopist appears (emerges) as an independent, passionate and free-thinking personality, who takes up (adopts) vis-à-vis social questions his own, – inimical to the ruling class – position, and, besides, attempts to justify and, in practice, apply this position by invoking (appealing to) eternal Reason. The utopist (intellectual) becomes the speaker of the folk's (people's) (popular) interests and Reason; [[and]] between the people's interests and Reason, an internal (inner) interrelation (connection) is made (restored, fabricated, manufactured, produced, established). But on this point, precisely (exactly) the double-sidedness (duality, dualism) of the utopists' (intellectuals') stance (attitude) appears vis-à-vis the folk: on the one hand, he (the utopist) sets himself the task of defending the people's interests, and of becoming their (the people's) true defender, he identifies himself absolutely with the people (folk) vis-à-vis the ruling class; on the other hand, this representation of the people is the sole possession (ownership, property, holding) of the possessionless (propertyless) utopist, the sole title, which gives him the possibility of raising, i.e. making, social claims for/on his own reckoning (account). In this latter case, however, a distancing from the people (folk) becomes necessary; now the utopist (intellectual) appears not only as the mere representative of the people (folk), but also as its (the people's) educator (instructor, trainer). The tendency of this education (training, upbringing), as well as the just mentioned interrelation of the people's (folk's) (popular) interests with Reason, exercise (exert) a direct influence on the intellectual(-spiritual) structure of Utopia. Because the dreams and the hopes of the (those who are) educated (instructed, trained) are translated into the language of the educator (instructor, trainer), and must thereafter be recognised in this reshaping (remoulding, reorganisation, rearrangement, transformation) again, and learnt anew by them (those being educated). Reason, the language of the

confrontation with the force of imagination (imaginative force)), serves – although it (Reason regarding what is unreservedly desired) aims at the transcending of these factors – the relativisation, the restriction (limitation, confinement) of the (what is [[seen as]]) unrestricted (unlimited, unconfined, unrestrained). This restriction (limitation), which means the end, i.e. final and conclusive, victory of Reason, finds expression in (through) the fact that the utopian dream becomes the utopian construction of novels/romances in respect of the state (state novels). Nonetheless, we have no conclusive reason to believe that the aforementioned subsumption of the utopian dream under Reason is an (the) eternal destiny (fate) of Utopia in general. What concerns new-times Utopia, i.e. as far as new-times (modern-era) Utopia is concerned, this subsumption, this victory of the logical construction, can only be an ideational expression of the increasing rationalization of (the) newer (i.e. more modern) times (era, age, epoch). If so (or: If that is correct/holds), then the victory of the rationalistic construction¹¹ reflects in part (partly) the victory of the newer (more modern), scientific world view over the religious (construction), at least in so far as the chiliastic dreams are of a religious, (of a) sectarian origin (provenance). In this case, not only does the Renaissance-like representation and notion (idea) of the state as a work of art (an artwork), or the subsequent (ensuing, resulting, later) representation and notion/idea of the state as a machine creep or slip (sneak) into Utopia, but also the factors or elements of rationality, reckoning (estimation, evaluation) and calculation stemming from the Renaissance.¹²

¹¹ (ALL FOOTNOTES ARE BY THE TRANSLATOR AND HAVE ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.!!!): “rationalistic” in that ideologically there is an emphasis on Reason as opposed to Revelation-Faith-God, and not because religious belief does not involve rationality, reasoning, logic, etc..

¹² (ALL FOOTNOTES ARE BY THE TRANSLATOR AND HAVE ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.!!!): i.e. “rationality, reckoning and calculation” as understood by the Renaissance mainstream, and obviously not meaning that such phenomena did not exist in other times/eras/epochs/ages incl. in differently understood and ideologised forms thereof.

This whole (entire) examination of the problem of the relation(ship) of the upper strata with the lower strata finds itself in tightest interrelation/connection with the problem of the status (standing, position) of the philosopher, of the knowing bearer of the general science, upon which the entire structure of Utopia rests (is based), (with)in the framework of this structure [[of the relationship between upper and lower strata in regard to the philosopher etc.]].¹³ In the Platonic state it is so (i.e. things are thus), that the domination of the abstract principle, of Reason and of Justice, is unambiguously and unequivocally connected with the domination of the tangible bearers of this principle, the philosophers. The upper strata rule (dominate) over the lower strata and this domination is justified by the interest of the Whole, and at the same time it (the said domination) presupposes the perception of this interest. However, in Plato, open (authority as) dominance (dominant authority) is possible because it rests (is based) on a – from the outset – existing (pre-existing) dissimilarity (diversity or difference) (in respect) of the anthropological faculties (aptitudes, gifts, (pre)dispositions, tendencies) of the strata; and because the priority (precedency, precedence) of the upper strata resulting in such a manner/way does not come into contradiction with an in principle belief (faith) in the equality of all men (humans, people). In (the) Utopias there are also the omniscient (all-knowing) (men) who stand at the head of the state (in terms of the history of ideas, that coincides with the fact that in the humanism of the 16th and 17th century, the ideal of the *homo universalis*¹⁴ was replaced by the ideal of omniscience (all-knowingness)). Now, however,

¹³ (ALL FOOTNOTES ARE BY THE TRANSLATOR AND HAVE ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.!!!): or in other words, the notion of Utopia is just that, a notion. It is not a real actually existing social phenomenon, but a thought structure concocted, propagandised, etc. by humans interacting and interrelating with one another, which may or may not inspire or otherwise motivate (some) humans towards certain, concrete social-political action (e.g. up to violence, revolution and war).

¹⁴ (ALL FOOTNOTES ARE BY THE TRANSLATOR AND HAVE ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.!!!): “A polymath (Greek: πολυμαθής, polymathēs, "having learned much",[1] Latin: homo universalis, "universal man") is a person whose expertise spans a significant number of subject areas, known to draw on complex bodies of knowledge to solve specific problems. ... Aside from "Renaissance man" as mentioned above, similar terms in use are homo universalis (Latin) and uomo universale (Italian), which translate to "universal man". ...“ E.g. esp. Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519) (<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polymath>)

