

ANSWERS OWED (OWING) AND DUE

by Panagiotis Kondylis

[[Translated by C.F., ©, Dec. 2018–Jan. 2019 from the Greek: Κονδύλης Παναγιώτης, «Οφειλόμενες Άπαντήσεις» (περ. *Λεβιάθαν*, τχ. 15, 1994 (= periodical *Leviathan*, issue 15, 1994 (Athens, Greece))) in Κονδύλης Παναγιώτης, *Μελαγχολία και Πολεμική. Δοκίμια και Μελετήματα* (= Kondylis Panagiotis, *Melancholy and Polemics. Essays and Studies*), Θεμέλιο (Themelio), Άθηναι (Athens), 2002, pp. 136-172. (A German translation not by P.K. of the Greek text was published in 2016: »Geschuldete Antworten«. In: *Zeno. Jahrheft für Literatur und Kritik*, Heft 36 (Jg. 37), S. 6-37)]]

The periodical (journal) *Leviathan* had the fortunate inspiration to publish in the context of this small tribute (dedication),¹ the observations of two studiers (researchers, readers) of my work, and asked me to comment upon these observations. I (shall) reciprocate (respond) with pleasure to the invitation, because these observations touch upon, in a or b way (manner, mode), central points of content and method –especially, however, I am glad (I rejoice) because they are written with an intensely critical disposition. Vis-à-vis lively and robust disagreement, various “rationalists” and ethicists, openly

¹ (Translator’s footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): Issue 15 of the Greek periodical/journal *Leviathan* (*Λεβιάθαν*) of 1994 – now out of print – contained a tribute to Kondylis including some of P.K.’s shorter texts: Answers to 10 questions; on Clausewitz, Conservatism, (Hegelian) Dialectics; the answers of this here “essay”; and other (related) material, including the essays criticising P.K.’s theory by Georgiou and Virvidakis.

(manifestly) or furtively (secretly), usually raise their eyebrows, because they live with (in) the hope, and off (on, from) the hope, that someday (correct) Reason (that is, theirs (their Reason)), and (correct) ethics/morals (that is, theirs (their ethics)), will predominate, whereupon opposing views and stances will necessary die out (off) (disappear, go into eclipse, cease to exist); thus, the current disagreement bothers (them), because it appears as an obstacle on the road (path) to future harmony (if it does not appear as a personal affront (insult, derogation) or disrespect (contempt, irreverence, impiety) vis-à-vis people working towards (for) such high (lofty) goals (purposes, ends)).² If, however, someone believes, as I believe, that acute clashes of ideas will not cease ever, because neither will acute clashes between humans ever cease as well, then he can see debates (i.e. disagreements (conflict(s)) as to argumentation) as an absolutely natural situation and or painless, and indeed consider them as an additional confirmation of his analyses as regards human affairs (matters, things). From this perspective, I thank from the beginning Messrs Georgiou and Virvidakis (Birbidakes), because with their conscious theoretical polemics against my positions, they provide an unconscious and unwilling (unintentional) factual reinforcement (corroboration) of them (my positions) (i.e. support for my positions in practice).³ Yet triumphant words (talk) (exultations) in advance are/is not prudent. I (shall) now move on to the commentary upon the two previous texts [[of the issue of *Leviathan* in question]] in the order they came/arrived in(to) my hands (came to my notice/attention).

² (Translator's footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): A-HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

³ (Translator's footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): A-HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

I

Although he feels like my philosophical opponent, Mr. Georgiou has the amiability to place my book *Power and Decision*, around which this discussion revolves, next (close) to (the) classical theoretical texts, not only because of its comprehensiveness (conciseness, succinctness), but also because of its lucidity (lucidness). I admit that I am bewildered (perplexed) and feel embarrassment when the lucidity of my text is praised precisely by someone who misunderstood (misapprehended) it at essential points.⁴ And my bewilderment and embarrassment are doubled because – even though I do not lack (I lack not) the disposition (mood), I am not in a position to reciprocate (repay) the amiability. Mr. Georgiou’s text abounds with conceptual confusion(s) and (points of) vagueness(es). Hence, all that will be said below will necessarily move for the most part at a relatively high abstract level, as we shall have to continuously thrash out, unravel, untwist and differentiate the concepts used. Everyone knows that knitting is done (takes place) differently with a neat ball of yarn (tidy (well kept-together and orderly) skein), and differently (otherwise) with an untidy and jumbled ball of yarn (skein).

Mr. Georgiou’s first objection is that the theory which is developed (which unfolds) in *Power and Decision* is self-referential, i.e., it is founded on its own logic and argumentative structure. I ask myself in truth what else could a theory do, whichever theory. Every theory rests (is based) on, whether it knows it or not, on a logical structure, on a conceptual armoury (arsenal), which forms it (the said conceptual armoury) in order to better serve its goals on each and every respective occasion; a normative theory, for instance, requires another (a different) structure, and another conceptuality; and a descriptive theory (requires) another (structure and conceptuality); a mathematical theory, another;

⁴ (Translator’s footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): A-HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

with one another in various ways; however, it is possible for them to be distinguished for analytical reasons. The first (theoretically slippery form of self-referentiality) rests (is based) on the development of theory (or of dogmatics) in such a way so as not to be able to be falsified by any factor external to itself. External as regards a theory, that is, as regards something located in a book or in a head (brain or mind), is, however, the whole of the world of specific and concrete historical experience, and precisely this (whole of the world of concrete historical experience), do the various (kinds of) ethicism(s) (moralism(s)) – whether they are theological or “rationalistic” – try to cast out (banish, expel). No earthly (worldly) sorrow (woe, anguish, pain, suffering), no injustice, no savagery (ferocity, fierceness), as frequently as they are repeated, shake the faith (belief) of the theologian in the infinite (untainted) benevolence (naivety) of God, just as it (i.e. every sorrow, injustice, savagery) does not shake the faith or belief of the rationalist, if not in the happy end of history, at any rate, in the possibility of the continual improvement (betterment) of humans and of society – all of that, of course, always under or with the guidance of each and every respective knower of the wants (wishes, desires, needs) of God, or of the commands of Reason. Here it is not a matter of empirical verifiability or falsifiability, and in this sense, self-referentiality is complete and air-tight, i.e. impermeable (waterproof, dry). However, not in the least does the same occur with regard to the theory expounded in *Power and Decision*. This theory, as is said expressly (p. 221 of the Greek edition (= p. 161 of the English translation)), can be confuted (proven wrong, refuted) if the analysis of our historically known ethical-normative theories shows that the latter (our historically known ethical-normative theories) are not structured in such a way as is described in the book, nor do they fulfil all the functions attached to this structure of theirs. Mr. Georgiou, nevertheless, does not at all enter (slip, ease himself) into matters of such empirical verifiability or falsifiability by using examples taken from social history or the history of ideas;

on the contrary, he stresses from the beginning that he desists from (foregoes, relinquishes) such a similar undertaking. If, however, he himself desists from the use of the criteria of control (i.e. of checking, testing, proof(ing), validating) expressly provided by my theory, with what right does he come along thereafter to formulate (put forward or express) and raise the objection of tautological self-referentiality? Is he (Mr. Georgiou), or is he not, in a position to show that a or b – historically-attested-to – theory was structured and functioned differently than whatever my own analyses claim or profess? Is he, or is he not, in a position to show that the a or b – historically-attested-to – identity of an individual or collective subject was formed and unfolded differently than whatever my own theoretical schemata suggest? These are the questions of essence, and seemingly important “methodological” systematic and deep studies undertaken with pleasure, – in regard to which all those who have nothing to say of essence (importance, as to the crux of matters) pronounce their feelings of satisfaction with pride –, do not release or exempt (or excuse) anyone from the obligation to answer these questions. The readers of my books will know that methodological problems are not unfamiliar to me;⁶ however, precisely (the) friction with them (i.e. time spent dealing with methodological problems head-on, without fear of clashing with “proven or given ‘truths’” etc.), showed that it is not permitted either for them (methodological problems) to be isolated, or for them to be used as an alibi. But, beyond Mr. Georgiou’s methodological preferences and performances, I can confirm that if he had undertaken to confute (disprove) the descriptive theory of the decision, he would have most speedily bumped (run) into insurmountable difficulties and predicaments. I have published a few thousand pages on the central problems in respect of the history of ideas and of social history, and these analyses do not constitute deep down

⁶ (Translator’s footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): A-HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Talk about understatement! Nobody has dealt with methodological problems and matters in the social sciences at the macro/general level like P.K., ever!

[[anything]] but empirical controls (checks, tests and proofs) and empirical verifications of the general theoretical positions of *Power and Decision*; thus, I have well-founded reasons to believe that it is immensely (very very) difficult for someone to navigate (sail or ply) the open seas and oceans in the opposite direction.

The second form of theoretically slippery self-referentiality is the constitution (i.e. composition or formation/establishing) of theory (or of dogmatics) so that the interpretation of the world and of man offered entails or presages (announces in advance, heralds) the prevailing (predominance) of the same theory, or of its bearer at the social level, i.e., at the general level of praxis (practice, action). I interpret the world in such a way that my prevailing and predominance, under (i.e. in (regard to)) the form of the ideals which I support, appears as a historical, rational, ethical, divine (godly) etc. demand: the careful observer recognises this schema from daily confrontations (conflicts, debates) (even personal confrontations too, and let us not speak at all of/not to mention at all political confrontations), however equally it (this schema) functioned, for instance, in the newer (more modern) philosophies of history – to confine or limit ourselves to only one great example. And here, as in the previous case (instance), the interweaving of theoretical self-referentiality with an ethical-normative intention, and with the related (relevant, pertinent) power claim, is given and primary (primordial, protogenic). However, the theory of *Power and Decision* does not at all deduce from its own presuppositions the perspective (prospect) of, or the wish for, its own social prevailing and predominance. It does precisely the opposite. It (the theory of *Power and Decision*) stresses most often and most emphatically that in the social field, ethicistic(moralistic)-normative theories dominated and will always dominate, and that only these can satisfy the human need for practical orientation, since the power claim inside of the circumstances of culture (civilisation) is always put together (co-joined, co-

articulated) with an Ought; it indeed points out that (a, the) presupposition of axiological ([[non-normative]] value) freedom at the level of descriptive theory, is the recognition of the absolute supremacy (superiority or pre-eminence) of (the) ethicistic(moralistic)-normative consideration (way of looking at things), irrespective of with or in what form, at the level of social praxis (practice, action) (*loc. cit.*, p. 14; cf. pp. 15, 19, 209ff. [[translator's note: if p. 221 of the Greek edition of *Power and Decision* is roughly p. 161 of the English translation, readers can find (albeit with some effort and searching) the pages in the English translation of those Greek-edition pages (14, 15, 19, 209ff.) just referred to by P.K.]). Mr. Georgiou misapprehends (misunderstands) and misconceives most deeply and seriously (grievously) the descriptive theory of the decision when he characterises it as “criticism/critique” or as “rejection” of normative theories. It (the descriptive theory of the decision) is simply their (normative theories’) morphology (i.e. the study of forms (form-related/formal structure)), and the analysis of their function(ing)). Only whoever wants to replace what is censured and criticised, or what is rejected, with something else, has the logical right of censure (criticism, reproof), or of rejection. I could not do this without adopting a radically different anthropology and philosophy of culture (civilisation)⁷. If,

⁷ (**Translator’s footnote. Absolutely nothing to do (but (very) indirectly) with P.K.**): i.e. the nature of man (human nature) is man’s culture, which means that man as a biological being distinguishes himself from other animals by virtue of his creation and production of symbols (incl. rationality) and tools not already found in nature, and always exists both:

(a) with his drives, urges, impulses (usually or rather nearly always of self-preservation (when we know suicides at the individual level are normally a small minority phenomenon – even though, e.g. heterogony-of-ends-related collective “suicide” is another interesting matter –, and often take place for the good of a human collective anyway, e.g. in the case of self-sacrifice), and of (at some stage in life) sex, etc.), his capacity for violence, but also for social disciplining, so that via culture such violence is, or can be, limited and channelled through “softer” forms of power (e.g. THE FULL-SPECTRUM ZIO-LOBOTOMY OF ZIO-USA via MASS MEDIA, MASS ENTERTAINMENT AND “EDUCATIONAL” BRAIN-WASHING AND INDOCTRINATION (this by no means, denotes or connotes that e.g. in Hellenic Rome there was not that era’s “from the pulpit” and other forms of brainwashing and indoctrination (ideologem(e)s, ideologies, etc.), or that such phenomena (including at times with much more violence) don’t take place in today’s China, India, Islamic world, Africa, etc.)), and,

(b) and within and through and or with reference to social relations and social interactions, which can and does include the phenomena referred to in (a), because apart from the separations and distinctions made as theoretical abstractions for the sake of comparing, discreetly analysing and comprehending phenomena, etc., in the real world, both the drives, impulses, urges, genetics, etc., and, the social relations, interactions, context(s), are always simultaneously – in one way or another – present.

All this means that all of human history until today proves that neither conflict, nor enmity, nor violence (including war), will ever be effaced or otherwise removed from human behaviour, even if under concrete circumstances and concrete conditions e.g. certain forms of violence and conflict in general can be considerably lessened, and all forms of co-operation considerably enhanced – but then again, by no means, EVER, *permanently*,... (every historical epoch has “its time in the sun”)... and just because things have been going more

that is, the descriptive theory of the decision became a social ideology, (whilst) ceasing to be a socially indifferent truth of the study-room (library reading room), it would have cancelled (negated, overridden, overturned) itself (self-negated, self-cancelled, etc.). But on this point, I shall come back again, below, where I shall also explain what pushes Mr. Georgiou to understanding as “rejection”, whatever is simple description.

In this way, the first objection is debunked (brought (shot) down, proven wrong), the objection of self-referentiality. Before I explain why the second objection is also baseless, which deals with the incompatibility of philosophical system and nihilism, let me note that this (second objection) itself is found to be in logical contradiction with the first objection (of self-referentiality): because if self-referentiality flows supposedly from the closed and logically absolutely cohesive character of my theory, then it is not possible that at the same time this same theory be accused that it contains (or has) within itself (entails, involves) a contradiction which renders impossible every systematic coherence. We put this, however, aside, without of course condoning (excusing, pardoning, forgiving) it, and we come to the so-called incompatibility of the philosophical undertaking in general with the position that the world and man do not have objective meaning. (Although here, Mr. Georgiou connects nihilism with the axiological (value(-related)) problem, I guess that he correlates it indirectly also with gnosis-theoretical, i.e. epistemological (pertaining to the theory of knowledge), scepticism. If by chance this is occurring (or the case), I refer him to my interview in this issue[•], answer to the fifth question). Mr. Georgiou

[•] Periodical *Λεβιάθαν* (= *Leviathan*), issue 15, 1994, pp. 11-27 (= Q. 5 of *Answers to 28 Questions*).

or less well for a number of decades, or some “philosopher” has dreamed of, and written in hundreds and thousands of pages, about “the world’s best and most perfect system”, one can say with certainty that human inter-action, inter-relations, the heterogony of ends,... will ensure that there will **never** be any kind of “permanent, eternal, peaceful happy end”.

contends (claims, asserts) this incompatibility (of the philosophical undertaking in general with the position that the world and man do not have objective meaning) axiomatically, and entirely without justification and without giving reasons, taking for granted (from where to where (or on what basis and to what extent)?), that only all those who accept the objectivity of values are worthy of the name of philosopher, denying (with what right?) this property (quality or characteristic) to great intellects(-spritis/minds) like for instance Hobbes, La Mettrie and Nietzsche, and falling in this way (does he know it, I wonder?) into the embrace (arms) of idealistic metaphysics and theology, without, however, again solving the ultimate problems (questions). I shall explain myself: when we say that the world and man do not have objective value and objective meaning, we mean that as much value and as much meaning as they do have, they take (them) from the actions (the results of acts/the acting) of specific (concrete) subjects. Subjects with meaning-giving and value-positive (i.e. ascribing values to the (human-social) world) abilities are however, from all we can ascertain indubitably (without the possibility of retort and of objections being raised), only humans, humans that is to say, are the only beings known to us which impart value and meaning to the world and to themselves: humans, not rocks (stones) or fish, said that man is the image and the likeness of God; humans, not trees and birds, wrote the Proclamation (Declaration) of the rights of man. Even if all people, without exception, were in agreement that their existence has meaning and value, even if everyone, without exception, was in concord and had reached consensus as to what precisely this meaning and this value is, and again, the objectivity of the value and of the meaning would not have been proved – for the same simple reason for which in our daily life we do not judge others on the basis of the idea which the same people have (in respect) of themselves (thus, e.g. Theodoros Georgiou considers false Panagiotis

Kondylis's self-understanding).⁸ Historical experience shows, of course, that the giving of meaning (meaning-giving) and the positing of values (i.e. ascribing positive values imbued with meaning and judgement to human-social and other world phenomena), are not done by "man", but by various individual and collective human subjects, which until now have never succeeded in achieving, or have never brought off, full and permanent consent (consensus) as regards this central matter of social life, but clashed and, as I believe, will clash forever on account (because) of the said central matter (of social life in respect of meaning-giving and value-positing). This constitutes an additional indication of the non-objectivity of meaning and of values. If someone needs an Archimedean point beyond the human = subjective perspective⁹, he must seek it in God or in the Platonic idea of the Good. And, again, he will not find the desired final solution. Because God's commands and the Good's commands were, are and will be, the object of the interpretation of concrete (specific) subjects inside concrete (specific) situations. And the practical result is the same

⁸ (**Translator's footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.**): i.e., the notion of objective meaning has not been proved because an agreement of subjectivities (i.e. individuals who all agree), is still not proving objective meaning with reference to all known empirical reality, from which an objective meaning could potentially be derived – and, of course, as we know, it can't. In other words, the objective meaning and objective value – if they could be proved – would have to be proved by viewing the whole human world, as it were, "from the outside", not as an Archimedean point P.K. goes on to refer to (or e.g. as in the case of John Rawls (whom I respect for serving his country as a soldier), and the ludicrous notion of using a heuristic device as "the original position" in an attempt to remove the particular biases of individual agents in order to demonstrate how rational beings might arrive at an objective formulation of justice,... just because the "Professor" said so... A-HAHAHAHAHAHA!!!), but by taking all historical facts and empirically verifiable data into consideration, and not just because a few people, or some people, or all people agree about something. Hence, if all people agree that an objective meaning and objective value is that there – Levinas-like – should be no killing because the meaning of life is to live naturally until one dies and that killing is evil and life is precious and Moses said so because Yahweh exists, one would then have to examine whether e.g. the state of Israel, or the state of Russia, or the state of China, or the state of the United States of America, or the state of Iran, etc., kill people or not, etc., and will find that the aforesaid Levinasian meaning and value positions cannot and could never possibly apply in general, universally, objectively, forever,... since i.e. at least some human behaviour/action at least implicitly indicates that killing per se is not valued as objectively "bad" with regard to life as meaning something "precious" just because e.g. Levinas said and wrote so (if that's what he wrote or suggested (I can't remember exactly now, but you know what I mean!)).

⁹ (Translator's footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): this means that even scientific observation, which is objective *if one accepts* the criteria for scientific explanation (empirical verification, logical consistency, elimination of all other possible explanations than the explanation proffered as empirically plausible, etc.), is "subjective" in the sense that it too, like all other perspectives, is a human perspective arising from humans existing in a concrete time and place, and is not per se binding on other humans, because there are people who'll e.g. believe in the Magic Monkey or the Golden Dingbat or some "newspaper of record" with an inordinate or highly disproportionate number of ???s in gross group over-representation producing "editorials and comment", etc., etc., etc., no matter what evidence you put before them, etc..

whether the subjects clash brandishing (flourishing) values, confessedly, of their own construction, or whether they clash with one another by invoking different interpretations of God's will (volition), or whatever other absolute supra-individual principle.

I insist on this point for reasons of essence and not to pursue the right of my theory to be called "philosophical"; the concept of "philosophy" is so abstract, that I gladly grant (concede, bestow) it to (upon) anyone who wants to keep it exclusively for himself. Also, reasons of essence, and not reasons of epistemological prestige, impel (push, drive) me to rebuff (deny) Mr. Georgiou's view that my social ontology in reality is simply political theory, since it puts at its (epi)centre, the friend-foe relation. As a matter of principle, it is an error to characterise this relation one-sidedly (unilaterally) as "competitive or antagonistic", since it is express(ed)ly (explicitly) double, it declares or states that the subject does not only have foes, but also friends (cf. my interview in this issue (of the periodical *Leviathan*, loc cit.), in particular, the answer to the sixth question (= Q6. of *Answers to 28 questions*)). But the conceptual confusion proceeds much deeper. As is known, the definition of politics as a friend-foe relation comes from Carl Schmitt. Mr. Georgiou, now, hears talk of the friend-foe relation, his associations or chain of thought lead him to Carl Schmitt, and with his only footing, foundation or prop being these associations or this chain of thought, he (Mr. Georgiou) comes to the conclusion that I accept Carl Schmitt's definition, and at the same time, I generalise (in regard to) him, whilst politicising, thus, my social ontology. But in which text of mine has Mr. Georgiou ever read that I accept Schmitt's definition? As I hope to show extensively, in a future publication of mine,¹⁰ the crucial logical error and leap (leap in logic) by Schmitt is that he took a relation with an anthropological and

¹⁰ (Translator's footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): obviously, P.K. had a clear plan in mind for writing *The Political and Man* (published posthumously in 1999) by 1994, and I suspect many years beforehand, perhaps in broad outline by 1984 when *Power and Decision* was published.

catholic (i.e. universal or general) social range, and he used it in order to demarcate or delimit, and to define, a narrower field than the field both of anthropology, as well as of society; however, the *differentia specifica* (the specific (distinctive, distinguishing) difference) of the broader genus cannot coincide with the *differentia specifica* (the specific (distinctive, distinguishing) difference) of the narrower genus. More simply: the/a horse *is* a four-legged animal, but we cannot define it by saying only this. The same also with politics: within (inside) politics, relations of friends-foes (friend-foe relations) exist, but these relations of friends-foes exist also outside of politics, therefore, the *differentia specifica* (the specific (distinctive, distinguishing) difference) of politics must be sought elsewhere.¹¹ As is obvious, this criticism of mine in respect of Schmitt differs radically from the usual criticisms of (Schmitt by) the ethicists (moralists), who reject his definition, not only because he is logically incorrect, but because they want to believe that from politics, the element of enmity and the perpetual *possibility* of the meta-development or transformation (meta-evolution) of this element into a fatal (deadly, lethal) clash, can be effaced (eliminated, expunged, wiped out). But the existence of enmity in politics, and the definition of politics on the basis of enmity, are two entirely different things – and, thus, all those who think that by debunking (bringing (shooting) down, proving wrong) Schmitt’s definition, they will definitively and irrevocably “humanise” politics, are deceiving (kidding) themselves. Be that as it may, my position(ing) vis-à-vis the definition above shows that Mr. Georgiou is not right when he reproaches (reproves) or blames me that I politicise (things), thus narrow, social ontology. That would occur only if, as he arbitrarily assumes, I accepted Carl Schmitt’s position.

I do not understand precisely what Mr. Georgiou means when he says that the descriptive theory of the decision bypasses (circumvents, goes around,

¹¹ (Translator’s footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): see *The Political and Man*, esp. Ch. 2, where there is discussion and or definitions of the social and society, the political and politics.

sidesteps) the problem of objectivity. And I cannot understand because here two different levels are confused: the level of presentation of theory, and the level of the objects which my theory examines, that is, its thematic level. At the first level, the problem of objectivity, i.e., the problem of what exists objectively, is solved without prevarications (equivocations, evasions) with (by) the fundamental axiom of my social ontology: there are no ideas, there are humans in concrete (specific) situations and group formations (groupings).¹² If, however, *this* absolute solution to the problem of objectivity at the level of presentation of theory (and Mr. Georgiou does not disprove (refute, confute) this solution) is valid, then it is obvious that it is not possible that the problem of objectivity be put in absolute terms at the thematic level of theory, i.e. at the level of concrete (specific) humans, who constitute the object under investigation (scrutiny):¹³ because if the ontological priority of the concrete

¹² **(Translator's footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.):** or in other words, there is no such thing as language without humans, whereas humans or proto-humans, or at the very least pre-humans, can exist without language (incl. e.g. the fact that only Eskimos had or have x number of words for "snow", and hence non-Eskimos had or have less than x number of words for "snow", etc.). Moreover, humans who as homo sapiens evolved from apes after going through a few? some? many? – presumably – other intermediate stages (to put it crudely in laymen's terms), were always social animals and as proto-humans and then "early-stage" humans developed language, which is a form of the creation of symbols, and involves an inherent human rationality found in all humans (now, the degree of intelligence and creativity in such rationality as between e.g. "black" Africans and "white" Northern Europeans and "yellow" Northern Asians etc. is another matter altogether that obviously "came into play" relatively recently, e.g. over the last 5,000-10,000 or so years, and presumably intersects with all sorts of geographical, environmental and social factors, whereas the rationality all humans *qua* homo sapiens have, – if I'm not mistaken –, goes back more than 100,000?, 200,000? years to its most primitive and unknown as-to-details origins. P.K. is, however, not an evolutionary biologist or sociobiologist, and he wrote from the point of view of the mere "observer of human affairs" *qua* such observer without any tools or other instruments, other than himself and principally the Western history of ideas. The other implication of P.K.'s notion of objectivity at the first level of the presentation of theory is that humans in societies (ultimately subjectively-arbitrarily, but historically accepted and or evolving) name things, e.g. "table, chair, spoon, elephant, breasts" etc. and society as a whole (and notwithstanding any individuals who are "crazy") simply accepts and uses those names as indicating certain things more or less or even without ambiguity in various forms of social action and social interrelations, but the same groups of humans can also produce notions which are (potentially) far more interpretable (to the point of clashing and fighting over them) by (groups of) individuals within society overall, e.g. "beauty, rudeness, fairness, equality, racism, feminism" etc., even if the (part imposed, part accepted and or absorbed) norm is still much more dominant than the exception.

¹³ (Translator's footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): because obviously humans as "mere" users and also as interpreters of ideas – apart from ultimately (as understanding ultimately abstracted from reality) existing before ideas, which they make, create, use, interpret, etc. – can and do clash as well as co-operate in relation to certain ideas as between one another, *qua* humans, whereas humans vis-à-vis other (non-human) animals display rationality and language etc. which the non-human animals do not display, and as mentioned above, humans create and use ideas – when we go back "to the beginning of human time" as an abstraction –, and not with the ideas, Plato or Leibniz-like, pre-existing *without relating to humans* to be used by humans (hence, when I am born into society and absorb and or learn to express a whole set of pre-existing ideas as I grow up as a child, I take those ideas from other humans, and do not pluck them, so to speak, from thin air, even if I create some

(specific) human existences is given, then the ideas and their claim of objectivity must be seen as functions or as derivatives (spin(-)offs) of the ontologically primary (primordial) element, as this is defined at the level of presentation of theory. In order for that to be understood better, we must also again make a crucial distinction: the distinction between the objectivity (or the claim of objectivity) of ideas, as this appears in light of the ontological principles of/at the level of presentation of theory, and, the objectivity (or the claim of the objectivity) of ideas, as this appears from the point of view of the thematic objects of theory, that is to say, of the concrete (subjective) human existences. The objective ontological principles of my theory show me that the ideas of concrete (specific) existences cannot be objective in the absolute sense (since they are existential functions), however this does not at all hinder the concrete (specific) existences from themselves considering as a rule their ideas as absolutely objective and correct; because neither do the human existences take into consideration my theory, nor does my theory attempt to “enlighten” human existences, simply it describes what they do.¹⁴ And indeed, my theory

ideas of my own (out of pre-existing language and my human (socially-related) capacity for language), which others either don't ever recognise, or over time, fall out of use, or – far more rarely – enter the mainstream of society, and whose origin more often than not, becomes lost, etc.).

¹⁴ **(Translator's footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K. – CAUTION! DO NOT READ THIS!!! NO POLITICAL OR OTHER NORMATIVE, IDEOLOGICAL PROGRAMME IS BEING IMPLIED OR OTHERWISE SUGGESTED WHATSOEVER):** again, at the social-ontological level of observation of human affairs, all humans (as individuals in or somehow related to groups of humans) act, including by using ideas, and all human groups and the individuals within them (unless they are somehow “strange”, “marginal” or otherwise “crazy”) believe in the objectivity of their ideas (and values), etc.. So e.g. even the “cultural relativists” (unless they're real cultural relativists – something rarely encountered in the real world), will for the most part and in the final analysis insist on certain values which accord with Western mass-democratic hedonistic consumption such as “anti-racism”, “diversity”, “pluralism” etc, so they can a) whilst not really being “cultural relativists”, feel good about themselves, and b) engage in various forms of wielding power including, through thought control and (ZIO-USA-SATANIC-centric) brainwashing, since it invariably “just happens” that they “conveniently overlook and forget” that the material basis for mass consumption in the West is based on – apart from the absolutely necessary, but tiny minority in terms of numbers, inventive, entrepreneurial and other kinds of “creative destruction” acumen, legal reforms, etc. – centuries of super-exploitation of masses and masses and masses of white (Christian) (and to a far lesser extent within the West, black) labour, and also (as reinforced more recently) Asian labour, aka “cheap labour”, whereas Satanic Circus Monkey People – those connected directly or indirectly with the International Jew (Joo, ZIO, Satanic Circus Monkey) of Banking, Finance, Trade and Corporations, qua Jews (subjectively seen as a matter of Taste as the most disgusting, revolting, reprehensible and filthy Animals in the whole History of Humankind), “just happen” to wield – including through Primitive Secret Society Networking – GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE forms of Wealth and Power, explained *passim* at www.panagiotiskondylis.com. Of course, such an observation refers to elite-level, and not all, Jews, and also does not imply any causation regarding Jews. Jews neither “rule the world”,

explains why human existences are obliged to ignore it (i.e. my theory) and consider their (necessarily existential-subjective) decisions as objective: because this objectification constitutes a condition of the constitution of their identity, of their ability at and for orientation and action. Mr. Georgiou's proposal is to me incomprehensible, in regard to which objectivity as the power claim of decisions is differentiated from the pragmatic command of the constitution of subjectivity.¹⁵ This, at any rate, is not my distinction, and for someone to undertake it, he would have to first confute (prove wrong, reconstruct) the fundamental axiom of my social ontology (something which Mr. Georgiou did not do, as I've just noted). Precisely the same applies with regard to the contradistinction by Mr. Georgiou between rationality and self-preservation. Whoever wants to maintain it (the said contradistinction) with consistency, will have to accept the ontological primacy of the rational idea vis-à-vis concrete human existence, he must, that is, go over (accede) philosophically to some form of Platonising idealism (i.e. Platonic-style idealism). Whilst in regard to Mr. Georgiou, the distinction between the level of presentation, and of the thematic level of theory, remains foreign (alien), and since he (Mr. Georgiou) lacks the analytical tools of the first level (of presentation), he is willing to take at (its) face value the self-comprehension of human existences, just as it (this self-comprehension) is put together or articulated at the second (thematic) level; he is, that is, willing to accept that

nor did they cause capitalism or industrial capitalism (the Northern European Protestants, Catholics and Secularists-Atheists principally did, though there definitely was also an in part causative ZIO-JOO/JEW banking and financial component). What has, however, definitely happened is what has been stated above in regard to GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE over-representation and accumulation of wealth and power in certain countries and or trans-nationally, as well as the also just mentioned GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE contributions to certain chains of causation. In any event, P.K. himself hardly refers to Jews (apart from the great and not-so-great thinkers his books and articles could not but refer to), at all, and obviously could not have been an "anti-Semite" (as if "anti-Semitism" could possibly be a problem e.g. for a (non-FULL-SPECTRUM-ZIO-LOBOTOMISED) Hellene who only cares about anti-Hellenism – have you ever met a Jew (JOO, Hebrew, Satanic Circus Monkey Person, Satanist Devil-Worshipper or ZIO) who cares about anti-Hellenism?), because the topic of the "Jew (JOO, JOOie, Hebrew, Representative of SATAN, Judas, ZIO)" *qua* JOOie (Jew, Satanist, etc.) did not in the least interest him.

¹⁵ (Translator's footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): this sounds like something introduced by Mr. Georgiou to create conceptual obfuscation and or to direct human-social action into "logical" and "rational" channels as various kinds of normativists invariably seek to do – one way or another.

whoever comprehends himself as a “rationalist”, escapes and breaks free from the gloomy (tenebrous, murky) labyrinths of self-preservation and of power, and places (posits) the process of the constitution of identity on a different basis – as if man also first becomes a “rationalist” (at what age, I wonder?), and later constitutes (composes, structures) his identity. For the descriptive theory of the decision, “rationalism” (more precisely: the confession of faith in rationalism) constitutes one only of many possible ways (manners, modes) of the constitution (formation, establishing) of identity of an individual or collective subject, one only of many possible forms of objectification of a decision. The role which “rationalism” plays in the constitution of the identity of certain subjects, in other subjects is played by religious faith, or various forms of “irrationalism” (intuition(ism) ((visionary) insight, foresight), exaltation (glorification) of the “life experience” (of “living”) etc.). As objectifications of the decision, on the basis of which identity is constructed, all these (mentioned above, whether “rationalism” or a form of “irrationalism”) equally constitute rationalisations. Therefore, rationalisation is a broader (more comprehensive, wider) concept than rationalism and, since rationalisation and rationalism do not coincide, the use of the formal tools (instruments) of logic against rationalism is possible. Precisely because this use (of the formal tools of logic) is general, just as the use of language is general, the non-“rationalists” do not feel that they are inferior (as opposed) to, or lag behind, the “rationalists”; indeed it is empirically known that most often the supporters and followers of a religion have a more rugged (chiselled, crude) and more ingrained (deep-rooted, entrenched, established, settled, consolidated, fixed) identity than many “rationalists”; they have at their disposal, i.e., more expedient (effective, useful) rationalisations. If Mr. Georgiou made the distinction between rationalisation and rationalism, and if he ascertained the crucial function of the former inside the process of objectification as the function of the constitution of identity, then he would have ascertained that every existence develops as much and such rationality as it

needs, and whatever rationality it needs, and then he would not have been concerned and worried (troubled, preoccupied). But he is concerned and worried because he gives to the term “rationality” an ethical(moral)-normative dimension, in accordance with his own philosophical preferences, and being ostensibly essential for all people/everyone (the classic instance (case) of tautological self-referentiality, as we have already pointed to).

And Mr. Georgiou’s next (following, ensuing) objection, which concerns the so-called contradiction between the existential relinquishment (renouncement, abdication, abandonment, desisting, foregoing) by the theoretician (theorist), and the primacy of the pragmatistic element, flows or results from the confusion between the level of the presentation of (my) theory as a theoretical meta-level, and its (theory’s) thematic level, that is, of the real level of concrete (specific) human existences. Only two magnitudes which are found at the same level can directly contradict each other (indirectly they can contradict each other only if the corresponding levels directly contradict each other in their totality; however, Mr. Georgiou not only did not show that the two levels of my theory contradict each other, but he did not even become conscious (aware) of their existence [[i.e. he was aware only of the second thematic level of concrete human existences, and not aware of the level of the presentation of (my) theory as a theoretical meta-level]]. The relinquishment (renouncement, abdication, abandonment, desisting, foregoing) by the theoretician (theorist) is realised and justified (explained via the giving of reasons, causes, etc.) at the theoretical meta-level in such a way, and with such an intention, that the constitution of the theoretical meta-level (of the personal territory (domain, territory, realm) of the theoretician (theorist), let us say/put it that way) does not blur (fog up, muddy) or obfuscate the comprehension (grasping) of the real level (more correctly: of that level of theory where its (theory’s) real thematic magnitudes, the concrete (specific) human existences, move), but on the contrary, entrenches (fortifies)

and consolidates its (the said real level's) ontic priority and precedence.¹⁶ In other words, existential relinquishment (renouncement, abdication, abandonment, desisting, foregoing) is precisely the precondition (prerequisite, presupposition) of/for the primacy of the real level, not its opposite (i.e. the opposite of existential relinquishment).¹⁷ To say it more graphically or representationally (illustratively): if the epistemological constitution of the meta-level had not rested or been based upon the existential relinquishment (renouncement, abdication, abandonment, desisting, foregoing) of the theoretician (theorist), that is, upon the putting aside of his (the theoretician's) own wishes (desires) and preferences before (in view of) the absolute ontic priority and precedence of the real level [[i.e. the second level of real thematic magnitudes and concrete human existences]], then theory could not, for instance, recognise soberly and impartially, as I believe, that the faithful person (believer) and the "rationalist" equally have at their disposal logic and identity; conversely, Mr. Georgiou, by denying that relinquishment, and by subjugating or subordinating the real level to this denial, is obliged to consider the identity of the "rationalist" superior to the identity of the believer/faithful person; he is, that is to say, obliged to interweave the analysis of the real level with the axiological (value) hierarchisation of its constituent elements. I do not accuse or reproach him for that, nor do I call on him to think "rationally" and to revise (review, reconsider) his stance. I point out that in this way anyone behaves who

¹⁶ (Translator's footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): this means that the scientific observer, by having the so-called meta-level of the presentation of theory in his theoretical and conceptual arsenal, so to speak, is able to survey those social-ontological forces and factors common to all humans, and then can also concretely analyse specific concrete human group and individual action by means of the "concrete as to specific, concrete human groups and individuals" scientific fields of history, sociology, psychology, human genetics, etc.. In any event, it is the study of history which principally gives one evidence of what the said social-ontological and anthropological forces and factors are (see *The Political and Man*), and thereafter the social scientist requires the discipline and the ability to be able to see human affairs both social-ontologically/anthropologically, as well as at the real (not just of theoretical abstraction) level of real, concrete action.

¹⁷ (Translator's footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): because if the scientific observer is not theoretically and ideationally fully detached as an observer, he is very likely to be misled by the various ideologies and forms of false consciousness of the concrete (specific) actors belonging to concrete (specific) times and places. It's one thing to understand the (way the) object of observation (understands himself or itself (in the case of a group)), it's quite another thing to confuse that understanding with the observed object's own self-understanding(s) and ideologem(e)s, ideology, ideologies, etc..

represents a normative perception (view), and that the doubting of the theoretical metal-level of a descriptive theory on the basis of such criteria is logically invalid (absurd) or misplaced, it is a *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος* (= *a change (passing over, shifting, transition) into another kind of genus (or category)*) [[cf. Aristotle = an illegitimate leap, i.e., a non sequitur]]. However, Mr. Georgiou contends (claims) something further still: that the existential relinquishment (renouncement, abdication, abandonment, desisting, foregoing) of the theoretician (theorist) constitutes a stratagem destined to secure him a privilege, the privilege of correct theory, and thus help him objectify his own decision and realise his own power claim.¹⁸ This contention is, from the point of view of logical structure, identical and equivalent to the known and trite argument against the scepticist: since he supports the truth of his sayings (what he says), he also accepts the possibility of truth, therefore, he does not differ from his opponents, as he wants to think.¹⁹ I have already shown why this argument is baseless (for the sake of convenience, I refer again to the interview which is published with this issue [[of *Λεβιάθαν* (= *Leviathan*), loc. cit., = Q5.²⁰ of the

¹⁸ (Translator's footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): but even if that were the case, the power claim is no more than a claim at possessing the most thoroughly objective "scientific" empirically verified, logically consistent knowledge possible, and stops there, because no norms are tied to such a power claim. There is no power claim here which amounts to wanting to get other people to believe and or do something (all that is done is describing and explaining), and we all know that the socially weighty power claims are those which – one way or another and ultimately – get people to believe and do many things, even up to violent things, in the private and or public spheres or realms.

¹⁹ (Translator's footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): whereas the scepticist only claims his own truth and does not claim truth per se (and in Mr. Georgiou's example, what is claimed by existential relinquishment is one's own theoretical privilege and not a privilege binding on others. All theories involve objectification and some kind of power claim, anyway, of their very nature.)

²⁰ (Translator's footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): "Your theory, world images are relative, is true, hence your theory as a world image is relative and false". No, sceptical positions cannot be refuted in this way. That my theory, like every other theory too, is historically determined does not prove its relativity, but merely (also) constitutes a confirmation of the principle of the historical determination of one's own example. (Conversely in respect of that, a theory, which considers itself undetermined (i.e. absolute and independent of historical determination(s)), not once makes understandable (or is in a position to make clear) the existence of other theories). Not the historical binding (or historical dependence), but the normative binding (or normative dependence) stands in the way of the truth of theories about human affairs (things)." The other way of looking at the matter is that if every position was relative *and* untrue (i.e. not in accordance with empirical reality and logical consistency), there would be no such thing as scientific knowledge and anyone could assert whatever they wanted without any objective criteria to judge the assertions against. Whilst absolutely strict science is definitely not necessary (and can even be counter-productive) for human-social life (ideologem(e)s, ideologies, religions etc. are far more prevalent), the scientific observer of humans affairs must show why his position is scientific, and apart from empirical verification and logical consistency, there is also non-normativism, as well

Answers to 28 questions]]), and I repeat for Mr. Georgiou: even if his position was correct, and again he would not prove anything other than everyone (including also Panagiotis Kondylis) objectifies their decisions and pursues power. But this constitutes *confirmation* of my theory, and nobody can debunk (bring (shoot) down, prove wrong) a theory by expanding (widening) the field of its application even more, nobody can, that is, formulate (put forward, express) a syllogism where the conclusion contradicts the major premise – and all the more contradicts itself, the less exceptions the latter (major premise) accepts (accommodates, suffers, can accept, allows). On this point, I shall return immediately below, by giving an answer to the objection that I proceed to (make, act upon) value judgements (evaluations, appraisals). Here, let me add that, beyond its insecure (dangerous, shaky, unsafe, risky, precarious) logical structure, Mr. Georgiou’s contention (claim) contains one further inaccuracy (imprecision). Mr. Georgiou talks of the theoretical privilege of the correct description of human reality as if that were a practical privilege, that is, like the proponent (lecturer, speaker, rapporteur) of the correct theoretical description laying claim to (asserting, demanding, pursuing), for himself, all that the real or aspiring (would-be) possessors of the privilege – (in respect) of the putting forward and formulation (expression) and interpretation of normative principles towards (vis-à-vis, for) the regulation or adjustment of the social behaviour of humans – lay claim to, demand and pursue. But, axiologically free ([[non-normative]] value-free) description would cease ipso facto being such, if from this (axiologically free description), normative (ethical) advice or commands could be deduced (inferred) capable of satisfying the power claims of someone, including the creator of descriptive theory. Theories seek their objectification (that is to say, they ask to become within (inside) society, a Whole, concealing (hiding) that they are always the expression of a part, an individual or a group),

as the organisation of the material analysed in such a way that it is as complete as possible and does not leave any gaps open for other more plausible or compelling explanations.

only since (because) they directly or indirectly represent an Ought. The theoretical privilege of the correct description could lay claim to, demand or pursue, and acquire (obtain), practical significance (meaning) only if the specific (special, particular) weight of pure theory inside society was notable (considerable); but it is something below negligible, and if it does not always appear (as) such, the reason is that many of those who exercise social influence by producing ideology take pleasure in the delusion that they exercise it (such social influence) by producing high theory. Not the theoretical action (the result(s) of an act or acts/the acting) of axiologically free ([[non-normative]] value-free) description of the world in itself, but its publication (a not necessary act/an act which is not necessary), begets (gives rise to) some reactions and fermentations (zymoses) (i.e. intellectual interactions producing specific kinds of (temporary) results or conclusions) in peripheral (marginal, fringe) circles, being of use, in the end, in a new mobilisation and self-reinforcement (support, corroboration) of socially dominant normative thought. Thus, the circle also closes again (or things come full circle). If axiologically free ([[non-normative]] value-free) description of the world changed the world and humans (people), then they would not have coincided any longer with this description of them (i.e. the axiologically free description of them (the world and humans)), that is to say, the axiologically free ([[non-normative) value-free]]) description of the world would have been (automatically) confuted (rescinded, negated, negated, cancelled, overridden, reversed, overturned, nullified) (automatically).

Mr. Georgiou's final objection, that is to say, that I proceed (make, act upon) value judgements (evaluations, appraisals), despite my programmatic declarations, stems also from a series of conceptual confusion(s). Mr. Georgiou justifies and gives reasons for (the causes of) his objection by saying that I fully reduce the axiological (value) level (level of values) to the pragmatistic, and that, since, thus, real conditions absorb values, therefore they are permeated by

them, and appear with (in) an axiological (value) hue (tinge, tone, complexion). Here, two entirely different viewpoints and concepts of the axiological (value(-related)) element, and of values, are recklessly-and-foolishly (mindlessly, uncritically, carelessly) mixed (blended, intermingled, commingled) (the logical error is so heavy (i.e. great or grievous) that unfortunately I cannot use a more forgiving (indulgent, lenient) word [[translator adds:] than recklessly-and-foolishly (in this English translation, taken as one word)]). Elementary epistemological pre-paideia or pre-education imposes or necessitates that one knows that it is one thing to analyse the form and the function of values generally inside of (within) their anthropological and cultural (cor)relations (nexuses, connections, links, bonds, relevancies, pertinence(s), interrelations), and an entirely different thing to use certain (my favourite (beloved, endearing) values) as criteria and as compasses of/for my analysis. If I do the former, then the *description of values* not only does not coincide with *axiologically militant description (value-militant description or description (which is) militant as to values)*, but also constitutes the only way (manner, mode) (in respect) of its evasion (avoidance). When I describe values, I do not classify or include (incorporate, order, categorise, integrate) them at the level of reality, i.e. at the thematic level of theory, as axes of description, but I classify or include them as an equivalent object of research next to many other anthropological and cultural factors. In other words, the classification or inclusion of values (with)in (in(side)) the thematic level of theory is done precisely in order for them (values) to also be found (there) where all the other objects of this level are found, so that their (values') privileged position inside ethical(moral)-normative systems is entirely removed, and so that they can no longer – in/whilst escaping from the thematic level of theory –, infiltrate the theoretical meta-level, whereupon from objects of analysis, they would be transformed (changed) into (the) criteria of/for analysis, that is to say, into axiological (value) judgements. Knowledge of human affairs is possible if one sees values as constituent elements of the human condition, as

magnitudes innate or connate (inborn, implicit, inherent) with it (i.e. the human condition), and at the same time interwoven with other magnitudes,²¹ and if one does not isolate them and raise them so high (hyper-heighten them) in order to use them as (a) Procrustean bed(s).²² When Mr. Georgiou reproaches or rebukes (blames [[me for]]) the fusion of the axiological (value(-related)) and of the real level, he forgets not only that the human condition inside the circumstances (conditions) of culture (civilisation) is interwoven so tightly (narrowly, closely) with axiological (value(-related)) preferences, (such) that, since even also biological functions obtain an axiological (value(-related)) dimension, no description of it (the human condition) is possible without reference to the form and to the function of values; he also forgets that there are two diametrically opposed ways (manners, modes) of separating or distinguishing the axiological (value(-related)) element from the real element: [[1]] to consider the second (real element) without being guided, lead (or [[otherwise]] directed) by the first (axiological (value(-related))) element: descriptive consideration (the descriptive way of looking at things)), or, [[2]] to separate or distinguish the first/former (axiological (value(-related))) as the criterion of analysis of the second/latter (real element) (whereupon, the axiological (value-related) (element) excels (surpasses, outweighs) the real (element), and is found at a level higher than the real: normative consideration (the normative way of looking at things)). It appears to me to be obvious which of the two ways (manners, modes) is at an (has the) advantage with regard to *scientific* criteria, since it can be shown empirically how values are formed and function inside the human condition, however we are not in a position to comprehend that the

²¹ (Translator's footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): such as the social relation (society), the friend-foe spectrum, the political, politics, the drive of self-preservation, identity and power, rationality, understanding, meaning, the mechanism of the social relation, the biological constant of death, the pressure of time, etc., etc., etc.. See esp. *The Political and Man*, passim.

²² (Translator's footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): "A Procrustean bed is an arbitrary standard to which exact conformity is forced" (<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Procrustes>).

world and humans would come (go, get) out(side) of, i.e. exit, values – except if we ended up also again in theology and Platonism.

Now, when Mr. Georgiou discovers in my text hidden (concealed) value judgements (evaluations), he gets entangled or embroiled in the same difficulties as also when he considers fictitious or imaginary the existential relinquishment (renouncement, abdication, abandonment, desisting, foregoing) of the descriptive analyst of human affairs (matters, things). Let us accept for the time being that in actual reality I evaluate or judge and put forward and formulate normative statements or decisions (adjudications). What would that have proved, if not simply and only that the general thesis of my book (*Power and Decision*) applies also to me in the same way? But to apply (implement, carry out) the general thesis of my book (with regard) to/on me, it must previously have been accepted as correct; how does the simultaneous acceptance and confutation (rebuttal) of a thesis hold true logically? And does not its (a thesis's) confutation or rebuttal through/by (means of) its application to one and only one subject, that is, its creator, constitute an argumentum ad hominem?²³ If, therefore, Mr. Georgiou's objection was well-founded (sound), and if the descriptive theory of the decision was also itself a normative theory and a power claim, then simply also only next to the rest of the value judgements (evaluations, appraisals) and power claims, there would come to be added still one more value judgement and power claim, with the result of the

²³ (Translator's footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K. as a footnote. **DON'T READ THIS!!!**): "*Ad hominem* (Latin for "to the person"), short for *argumentum ad hominem*, is a fallacious argumentative strategy whereby genuine discussion of the topic at hand is avoided by instead attacking the character, motive, or other attribute of the person making the argument, or persons associated with the argument, rather than attacking the substance of the argument itself [[CRAZY Literary-Satirical-Literary Persona adds: this is what (elite-level) JOOies (Jews, ZIO-Satanists, Devil Worshipers, Satanic Circus Monkey People) are masters at! Particularly when they GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATELY make use of the mass media/infotainment and "Academia" with their "Academies" as well as the Courts of LAW etc. (every single FILTHY ZIO SCUM (Jews, JOOs, JOOies, Satanic Circus Monkey DEVIL WORSHIPPERS) through PRIMITIVE SECRET SOCIETY NETWORKING), to present things as it suits them for the purposes of maintaining and, if possible, expanding GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE forms of Power and Control (and Wealth) for Mammon and SATAN]]. The terms *ad mulierem* and *ad feminam* have been used specifically when the person receiving the criticism is female. However, its original meaning was an argument "calculated to appeal to the person addressed more than to impartial reason"" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ad_hominem).

intensification or heightening of polemics and, in this way, the confirmation of the descriptive theory of the decision. The crucial point, therefore, is not to accept that this (descriptive theory of the decision) embodies (includes/contains/possesses/has (inside itself)) value judgements, but for it to be shown that normative theories do not have either the form or the function which that (descriptive theory of the decision) attributes to them (normative theories). But something like that, as we know, Mr. Georgiou does not attempt or undertake at all. Moreover, however, he does not expressly say which values and which behaviours, my so-called crypto-axiological (crypto-value-related) theory constitutes. And at this point, he causes (a point of) confusion: he considers as specific/concrete behaviour whatever is the anthropological framework and the anthropological precondition (prerequisite) of *every* behaviour and, correspondingly (analogously), he believes that the description of this framework and of this precondition constitutes a normative suggestion (indication, recommendation) of specific/concrete behaviour. However, it would be funny or ludicrous for someone to assert or contend that whoever ascertains that humans breathe, does so because he wants to urge (exhort, goad) them to breathe so as not to die. When, therefore, we ascertain that humans want to preserve themselves (as in self-preservation), i.e. to obtain identity and ability at orientation, we are not telling them what they *are obliged* to do, because their self-preservation is not something which they can also not do: most simply, it is impossible for human social beings to exist whilst lacking in identity and ability at orientation. The axiological (value(-related)) and normative stance has no relation(ship) with this ascertainment [[translator adds: of anthropological and social-ontological magnitudes (forces and factors)]] in itself; it (the said axiological and normative stance) begins when one proceeds one step further, wanting to take the ascertainment that man cannot exist without ability at orientation, as the starting point in order to dictate to him (man) *how* he is obliged to orientate himself, *which* axiological (value(-related)) orientation he is obliged to choose, and *which* to reject.

Precisely this, the descriptive theory of the decision does *not* do, since it recognises the fundamental functional equivalence of all axiological (value(-related)) orientations.²⁴

II

Mr. Virvidakis dedicates a great part of his text to a synopsis of my views, which, as he himself admits, is simplistic and presents gaps or lacunae. This, in principle, is neither unfair and illegitimate, nor infertile, simply it is inevitable. The problem is what one retains and what one overlooks, what one stresses and what one hushes up. Mr. Virvidakis's synopsis includes certain very gross (crude) theses, effortlessly (easily) adapted to an also gross and blurred (turbid, opaque) schema about (concerning) "scepticism", which he himself has in mind. And even though he recognises that in my thought, not a few elements exist which differentiate it from other "scepticisms", nonetheless, neither does he praise (extol) them, nor does he even examine if the quantitative differentiations become qualitative; whatever he comprehends from my theoretical positioning (stance), he comprehends it since he classifies or includes it in his abstract and unrefined (untreated, unprocessed) picture (image) as regards "scepticism". The unfortunate, but to be expected, result is that on essential points, as I shall show, either he violates (transgresses, breaks in through) open doors (i.e. he tries to

²⁴ (Translator's footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K. as a footnote): in the answer to question 19 of the *Answers to 28 questions*, P.K. states "... however a substantial contribution to the knowledge of human affairs (things) requires a total (complete) existential commitment (enlistment, call to arms), the vigilant observation of concrete situations of living people, and an unstoppable distillation (filtering, refinement) of observations with relentless (unbending) reflection (thought), which does not retreat before (in the face of) any bias and does not fear clashing with anyone and anything. One could call this stance an ethic (ethical) (it is certainly a form of internal asceticism), however it does not have any relation with ethics as a norm (rule) of social behaviour; on the contrary, it can conflict head on with such a norm." This is the answer to those who say that all people are always "within values" and also ideation. Yes, but not necessarily normative values and ideology – and the absolutely consistent scientific observer of human affairs is always "value-free" or "axiologically free" in the sense of being outside of *normative* values and ideology, even if he is within values most broadly defined and also ideation (ideas, social-ontological/anthropological rationality, language, understanding, meaning, socially necessary identity and orientation). Also, see the text just before and after footnote 33 below.

prove something self-evident and already known), or he attributes to me positions which I reject directly, unreservedly, unequivocally and through and through. And still something else: by fighting in this manner, generally and undifferentiatedly (i.e. in an undifferentiated manner) against “scepticism”, he demurs or counterposes to it (scepticism), also very general arguments, those age-old and known-to-all/everyone arguments, as every beginner-studier (novice student) of philosophy knows. Such arguments would have sufficed perhaps if the book which Mr. Virvidakis judges (*Power and Decision*) was the book of some novice addressed or directed to novices too. However, Mr. Virvidakis points out most politely (nobly, chivalrously) that the quality of the book is much higher. If, therefore, he contradistinguishes (contrasts) to it (the said book), positions which every neophyte or novice of philosophy is obliged to know, he does it (the book in question, *Power and Decision*) an injustice from the beginning (before dealing with the core content of the book/main matter at hand).

Under/With these dubious (doubtful) preconditions or presuppositions, Mr. Virvidakis classifies me with (amongst) scepticists, without me having written anywhere that I belong with them, and without me considering myself as such (i.e. as a sceptic). Whatever I myself call or name the “nihilism” of the descriptive theory of the decision does not (inter)relate with any kind of scepticism, but rather means, in the sense which I already explained in referring to Mr. Georgiou, that the world and man objectively (de facto or as it arises from reality) have no [[translator’s addition: inherent]] meaning; this position, I shall consider (it) true (up) until someone proves to me empirically that something beyond man and beyond (the, a) human perspective attaches value to man and to things, (a) value ascertainable like, for instance, the length and the weight of a body. Against gnosiotheoretical (epistemological, pertaining to the theory of knowledge) scepticism, I emphatically support in my book, the possibility of the

knowledge of human affairs (matters, things), and the establishment or setting up of a social ontology, and when I ask for, or seek, axiologically free (value-free) consideration (the axiologically free way of looking at things), I do it precisely to found such a knowledge; the intention of firm (unshakeable) knowledge cannot, therefore, be denied (with regard to) me, even if someone does not consider axiological (value) freedom as a means adaptative to obtaining firm knowledge, or as a feasible means. At any rate, the application of this principle (of axiological (value) freedom) to the attempt or effort at pragmatological, i.e. factual analysis occurs basically for one reason which common sense (the (common) nous) regards as self-evident in everyday life: nobody can simultaneously be judge and plaintiff or defendant (litigant, contestant); nobody, i.e. can identify from the beginning (before the trial of the case (matter, litigation, cause)) with the values of one side, and at the same time to act as the judge of/in regard to differences (disputes) with others. And even though we know from experience that justice is imperfect, incomplete and partial, nonetheless, from this we do not draw/extract the conclusion that because it (justice) is, anyway, imperfect and incomplete, it is obliged to become even more imperfect and more incomplete, that, because it (justice) is, anyway, partial, it is obliged to become even more partial. But this is precisely what Mr. Virvidakis does, since he does not ascertain simply (between others (other cases), and in my case) the interweaving of pragmatological, i.e. factual and axiological judgements (evaluations, appraisals), but rather, in addition, from this ascertainment, he draws/extracts the demand of/for the programmatic connection of these (value) judgements, as long as of course this connection is realised under the aegis of correct values (read: of his own values). Otherwise, he would not have apportioned or ascribed to me precisely the bad connection of pragmatology, i.e. the study of facts, and (value) judgement (evaluation, appraisal), he would not have apportioned or ascribed to me, that is to say, simultaneously *both* that I judge (evaluate, appraise) *as well as* that my (so-

called) values (polemics, relinquishment (renouncement, abdication, abandonment, desisting, foregoing), pessimism) are incorrect. Which of the two positionings (between axiological (value) freedom (notwithstanding (value) judgement not being perfect and or complete), and, judging matters with “incorrect” values judged to be “incorrect” by a particular person) is more sober and more impartial seems to me to be as clear as day: because I, despite my *theoretical* opposition to Mr. Virvidakis, do not in the least consider his values incorrect, since according to my opinion, the matter (issue) of the “correct” and of the “incorrect” is not posited at all at the level of values.²⁵ The sobriety and the impartiality of my theoretical positioning reaches up to the point where I say that the values which Mr. Virvidakis accepts together with many others (other people), have and will have in the future a much greater social acceptance than whichever or whatever descriptive theory, because people need precisely such values, in a or b form – irrespective of whether they do “well” or “badly”. But on this point, I shall have to come back, because it is a matter of something which Mr. Virvidakis obviously has difficulty in comprehending.

As regards the methodological demand of/for axiological (value) freedom, Mr. Virvidakis says two things (which are) contradictory between them: that this demand constitutes a regulatory (regulative, prescriptive) ideal (in regard to this I am in agreement), and that this same demand does not have at its disposal logical coherence. But how is it possible for someone to use as a regulatory (regulative, prescriptive) ideal such a logically so shaky (unsound, insecure, unsafe) demand, except if one decides to suicide scientifically? On this point, at all events, I do not desire to insist excessively, because the (Mr. Virvidakis’s)

²⁵ (Translator’s footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): social-ontologically and sociologically there are values in relation to all humans in societies and or with reference to social relations. Social-ontology and sociology are not in the least interested in doing anything other than ascertaining that there are values, which people classify as “good” and “bad” and anything in between, but without deciding which are the “good” or “bad” values, since they are value-free in the sense of non-normative and non-judgemental, simply describing and explaining human phenomena (as regularities in the case of sociology), and the common and or potential forces and factors (or “magnitudes”) thereof (in the case of social ontology).

text is unclear, and the general context does not allow me to guess (divine) with certainty if Mr. Virvidakis accepts himself that axiological (value) freedom constitutes a regulatory (regulative, prescriptive) ideal, if he refers to this as the view of others, or if he says it on the path of discourse, i.e. in the flow of his words, or in passing. What appears to me to be certain, at any rate, is that the demand of/for axiological (value) freedom is apportioned or ascribed the absence (lack) of logical coherence. But this reproach or blame is not at all founded (established), but rather is expressed (uttered, said, pronounced) axiomatically and tersely (curtly, sharply, abruptly), without even its logical and heuristic (investigatory) advantages being explained: why is the demand of/for separation of being and value an absence or lack of logical coherence, and their (being and value's) (ad)mixture at a theoretical level is not a much greater logical sin – which after all (at the end of the day, when all is said and done), as certainly Mr. Virvidakis will also know from different tragicomic(al) cases (instances), not rarely ends up in the simple defence of the tastes of this (one) person or that (another) person?²⁶ Equally unfounded inside his text, is the position that the demand of/for axiological (value) freedom is not reconciled with the observation of values as power claims. Here, Mr. Virvidakis, not only does not proceed (go forward) to (carry out, act upon) to any pragmatological, i.e. factual or logical analysis, but he also lapses (falls) into (committing) two most weighty (grievous) offences ([[theoretical]] crimes), that is to say, one most essential omission, and one sleight of hand (trickery, deception, adulteration, fraud, spuriousness). The omission rests (is based) upon the fact that there is not even a hint (no hint at all) as to how in Max Weber axiological (value) freedom is connected with a consideration of values as the products of decisions. Mr. Virvidakis, although he refers to the genealogical tree of my

²⁶ (Translator's footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): again, the absolutely false "logical problem" arises because "critics" of value freedom do not distinguish between normative (and subjective) values, and, value in its broadest sense, including the "value" of engaging in non-normative, value-free observation.

thought, does not mention Max Weber at all, who for me constitutes a central theoretician (theorist) (as the also unmentioned Marx is too), and whose study (i.e. the studying of Weber) I commend urgently. The sleight-of-hand (trickery or deception), now, consists in the following. By ignoring Weber, Mr. Virvidakis contends that I take “my methodological credentials” from Nietzsche, who, however, in contrast to me, does indeed consider values as functions of power, yet rejects the ideal of axiological (value) freedom. Here, Mr. Virvidakis hushes up and hides from the reader that I precisely for this reason have exercised on-going and detailed criticism/critique of Nietzsche’s methodological inconsistency, and he quotes/cites a phrase from the text of my criticism/critique of him (Nietzsche) (another related text exists, much more extensive, in my book *Die neuzeitliche Metaphysikkritik* (= *The new-times critique of metaphysics*), p. 538ff.) in a manner which suggests (makes) the impression that this criticism is not related to this crucial here point. Thus, an error by Nietzsche, which indeed I myself have pointed out, is turned against me as an argument!

Although I accept and although I exercise the possibility of knowledge of human affairs, Mr. Virvidakis insists on considering me a “scepticist” because I deny (value-)judging (evaluating, appraising) (things). In his eyes (view), knowledge and (value) judgement (evaluation, appraisal) are interwoven from the very beginning (outset); hence, whoever, as a “nihilist”, denies the objectivity of values, denies knowledge as well. Apart from the logical sides (aspects) of the problem, a better familiarisation with the history of ideas would show (exhibit to) Mr. Virvidakis that the bond of gnosiotheoretical (epistemological, pertaining to the theory of knowledge) and ethical (moral) scepticism is not at all compulsory. The fideistic tradition in theology, for instance, always aligned itself with/in favour of gnosiotheoretical/epistemological scepticism, or agnosticism, in order to prove that faith (belief)

in God and in related values, is not something which man's finite mind (nous) can give, but only a world-theoretical stance and decision. The *fides quaerens intellectum*²⁷ of Augustine shows a much deeper understanding (comprehension) of the mechanism of the taking and formation of normative decisions than that which our contemporary "rationalists" – who do the same as the theologians, only that they do not know it – have at their disposal (possess). But I (shall) pass (skip) over (shrug off) historical examples, to say that I find it paradoxical for Mr. Virvidakis to blame or reproach (rebuke) the search for objectivity beyond axiological (value) judgements, the moment he himself promises and considers possible many more things: both objectivity, as well as the safeguarding (assurance) of normative principles (cf. his phrase "we can, I believe, recognise that the concepts of truth, of rationality, of logical correctness have a normative texture (composition or constitution (nature)), without being driven to the doubting (calling into question, questioning) of their objective validity"). On the basis of Mr. Virvidakis's presuppositions, it would seem to me understandable if he said that truth is the function of the normative principles adopted on each and every respective occasion. But it constitutes a real coup de force (= stroke (blow, coup, shot, bang) of force (strength, power, might, muscle) = a sudden, violent act, or a coup (overthrow, takeover)) to hold intact (whole, complete, undamaged) "objective validity", and to pursue, also intactly (wholly, entirely), the power (and being in force) of normative positioning, which obviously concerns not only epistemological, but also ethical (moral) matters (otherwise, Mr. Virvidakis would not consider ethical (moral) "nihilism" as a cognitive obstacle). This mixing of the epistemological and of the ethical (moral) concept of the normative – or the axiological (value(-

²⁷ (Translator's footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): "Fides quaerens intellectum means "faith seeking understanding" or "faith seeking intelligence". It is the theological method stressed by Augustine (354–430) and Anselm of Canterbury (c. 1033 – 1109) in which one begins with belief in faith and on the basis of that faith moves on to further understanding of Christian truth."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fides_quaerens_intellectum

related)) – element, reveals (a) serious (aspect of) confusion in the conceptuality and in the thought of Mr. Virvidakis. In other words: of course it is correct that knowledge presupposes (value) judgements (evaluations, appraisals), however, cognitive-epistemological judgements (evaluations, appraisals) and values have a meaning (sense) and texture entirely different to that of ethical (moral) judgements (evaluations, appraisals) and values.²⁸ I judge (evaluate, appraise) epistemologically means that in the knowledge of the finite character of my human cognition or understanding (comprehension), I set aims, I give priority to the study of that thing vis-à-vis the study of the other (thing) (of another thing), or of that side which it has, as opposed to its other side, whilst recognising that more (many) standpoints (points of view) are legitimate (appropriate), since the same researcher can alternate (interchange) them, and since he can gain and benefit (profit, take advantage) from the work of others, who set out (started) from other starting points. Here, the criterion is the fertility of the perspective, i.e. how many and which empirical phenomena are explained by every standpoint (point of view); the same criterion decides as regards the relative supremacy of one standpoint and of one perspective vis-à-vis the rest (of the perspectives). However, ethical (moral) axiology is *both* empirically unproved (proofless, unconfirmed, indemonstrable, undemonstrable, unsubstantiated) *and* does not accommodate or adapt to alternative or supplementary (kinds/forms of) consideration(s) (i.e. ways of looking at things) *as to the same* object: on the one hand, I can weigh up if in the given case (instance) this or that ethical (moral) act is preferable, but on the other hand I cannot, if I want to remain ethical (moral), radically alternate or interchange choices and, instead of, for instance, helping someone, kill him. Nothing, however, does not obstruct (bother, impede) me from examining cognitively, beyond ethical (moral) (value) judgements (evaluations, appraisals), what will be the consequences if I

²⁸ (Translator's footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): cf. footnote 24 above.

help someone or if I kill him (them), just as also nothing obstructs me from examining what arises (emerges) if I observe a phenomenon, having accepted the deterministic perception or view, and what arises (emerges) if I observe it as the denier of this (deterministic) perception or view.

I ask myself if Mr. Virvidakis has thought seriously about what are the extreme logical consequences of the interweaving of axiology and pragmatology, i.e. the study of facts, and if these consequences would always be pleasant to (him) himself. At the ontological level, an honest and perspicuous interweaving of Being (Is) and Ought, made (created, crafted) without prestidigitations (magic tricks, sleights of hand) and elaborate prevarications (evasions, elusions), leads straight to Platonic idealism or to theology (in accordance with each and every respective preference). Because also the Platonic idea of the Good and the Christian God are nothing other than the identifications (equating(s)) of (the) true Being (Is) and of (the) true Ought, where absolute objectivity, the *ens realissimum*,²⁹ constitutes the function of ethical (moral) Reason (Logos), and the other way around. Of course, most of today's (present-day) "rationalists" retain (hold) this schema whilst denying parallelly "every metaphysics" and whilst wanting, in this way, to make garlic dip without garlic. But the difficulties (predicament(s)) and the facetious (jocular, humourous, flippant, frivolous) goings-on (carrying on) do not end here. If in actual fact the junctim [= (Latin) both together, jointly] of ethics (morals, morality) and knowledge applies, then we would have to posit/pose the ethical (moral) problem wherever a cognitive dilemma pops (crops) up (arises, emerges), and define which ethics (morals, morality) promotes knowledge and which bothers it – and in the final (ultimate) analysis, we would have to say, just like the Christian Fathers, that able for "true" knowledge are only the pure

²⁹ (Translator's footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): *ens realissimum* (Latin, = the most real being) A term for God, reflecting the belief that reality, like goodness, comes in degrees, and that there must be a limiting, ultimately real entity (<http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095752787>).

at (of the) heart. Would it however be possible to apply this principle everywhere and say, for instance, that whoever loves his fellow humans more will also become a better doctor, or that whoever feels more ethical (moral) exaltation (uplift) in viewing (sighting) (the observation of) the universe, will be the/a more perspicacious (perceptive, far-sighted) astronomist (astronomer) or physicist? The question perhaps seems ludicrous (comical, funny) today and or malevolent (malign) on my part, however, I mean it in its literalism. Because for a consistent representative of the interweaving of Being (Is) and Ought, like Plato, mathematical and cosmological research in actual fact was connected most deeply with the attempt and effort at accessing (access vis-à-vis/towards) the idea of the Good.

I come now to Mr. Virvidakis's second basic objection, that is to say, that the descriptive theory of the decision can be empirically disproved (refuted, rebutted, confuted, reconstructed), after previously I answer briefly his aporia or query if this theory (i.e. the descriptive theory of the decision) constitutes philosophy or science. I have said, both here and elsewhere, that these appellations (designations, names, naming(s)) of mine, are entirely indifferent on account of their vagueness and of their multiple meanings (ambiguity), which are due to the fact that many sides simultaneously seek and pursue for themselves the monopoly of "true" philosophy and of "true" science. My concern is not participation in such disputes (conflicts, controversies), which have been continuing (on-going) for twenty-five centuries (since twenty-five centuries ago), but the especially close and detailed study of (indulgence in) various (diverse) individual sectors with the aim of the formulation of historical, sociological and anthropological generalisations which are able to accept empirical verification or falsification. And I ascertain that Mr. Virvidakis, despite the announcement of the empirical confutation of *Power and Decision*, has done nothing in this direction, which in truth is more difficult than high-

are born, as positionings or as concepts, only *inside* the human condition, and they cannot constitute guides (pointers, models, standards, gauges, measures) on the basis of which man and the world could be characterised from the outside. I (shall) suggestively (allusively) pass (skip) over (shrug off) only the gross (crude) mistake which Mr. Virvidakis makes when he accepts an organic nexus or interrelation (connection, link, bond, correlation) between “pessimistic” anthropology and scepticism (Kant, for instance, believes that inside man exists something “radically evil (bad)” without at all considering ethical (moral) values to be relative), in order to stress the following: empirically, neither do we know, nor shall we ever learn if or whether man is “good” or “evil (bad)”; we can only ascertain that he (man) is in a position to do (commit) deeds/acts (to act), which certain people feel them as being pleasant and beneficial, and also acts/deeds, which certain people feel them as being unpleasant or harmful (damaging). In other words, daily and historical experience show us that man (as an individual or as a specific (concrete) group) can be considered by other people as a friend or as a foe (these two words, it goes without saying, are used as conventional, but eloquent (fluent) condensations of a plethora of hues, nuances, shadings and gradations). Man is neither necessarily “evil (bad)” when he kills, nor is he necessarily “good” when he loves. He is an open and fluid being, and if he thirsts so much for an identity, if he hooks, grabs and latches onto whatever gives him orientation (for instance, ethics (morals, morality)), he does it precisely out of fear before, or in the face of, the possibility or potential of remaining whatever he is, that is, open and fluid, uncertain and unsteady (unstable, unballasted). Thus, all potential scenarios are continually possible and all situations are ceaselessly (potentially) on the way, i.e. (potentially) about to happen. Human societies cannot live either in a state of war without pause or break (respite, breathing space, a lull), or in a state of imperturbable (unspoiled, unmarred, undisturbed) peace. Friendship and enmity do not simply succeed one another, but co-exist and soak and are steeped in each other, since

friendship as a rule goes, directly or indirectly, with the common positioning against a common foe (something which in its most painless form is called “we have common interests”); and there exists no friendship which cannot lapse into enmity, just as the other way around. These ceaseless changes, transformations and oscillations (swing, fluctuations, seesawing(s)) are the function of specific (concrete) conjunctures and groupings; they are not carried out, i.e., because the (same) man one minute is “good”, and the next (other) minute becomes “evil (bad)”.

Friendship and enmity, consensus (consent, acquiescence) and clashing (conflict), constitute, therefore, the empirically attested to (witnessed) and known human relations. I have no theoretical or personal difficulty in accepting the fact of friendship and consensus (acquiescence, consent), whilst ascertaining, also empirically, their always partial and transient (transitory, impermanent) character, which, incidentally, they share with enmity and clashing/conflict. However, Mr. Virvidakis, like precisely Mr. Georgiou too, whereas he does not say a word about how he explains – from the standpoint of “rationalism” and of the related optimistic anthropology – the indubitable fact of enmity, he distorts (twists, skews, warps) his own thought, when he interprets the schema “friend-foe” as meaning only enmity. Which it does not mean in the least; it means whatever it says it means, i.e. friendship *and* enmity, as two inextricable stances and situations interwoven between and with each other. One easily understands why various ethicists (moralists) grouch or become cantankerous vis-à-vis this elastic, comprehensive and empirically unassailable (invulnerable, immune) schema, even denying also to record or register it (note it down) as it occurs and is reported: the happy end of general “rational” consensus spoils things for them, which they think they will accelerate or speed up by refuting one-sided “pessimistic” anthropological theories. If, however, the happy end does not come [[about]] (arrive), for that, no theory will be

responsible apart from the same anthropological (and the rest of the other) factors which acted until now determinatively inside of history. And if someone has reason(s) to believe that future history will go on a different road/path (or go another way) in regard to this crucial matter, he must prove it, not with trite and banal theoreticisations, which only “philosophers” take seriously, nor with even more trite and banal missals or wish lists, which always included sermons (homilies) as well, against “pessimism”, but rather is obliged to locate the new and hopeful or promising trends and tendencies with a serious economic, political and strategic analysis of today’s planetary reality. Other such things are found outside of the horizon of professional philosophers, who not only feel disdain and look down with contempt on entering into [[dealing with]] such prosaic matters, but also avoid posing the also prosaic as much as painful (baleful, aching, afflictive) question: why have not ethical (moral) theories and commands not been realised until today at (their) face value? In my book, I put forward and formulate a theoretical provocation to(wards) ethical (moral) philosophers, which Mr. Virvidakis, (whilst/in) doing the prudent (wise, sensible, advisable) thing, hushes up or, even doing so more prudently, perhaps did not want to become conscious and aware of it: I provoke them, therefore, to draw up and map out an ethical (a moral) theory, which will empirically explain the reasons of the practical failure of ethical and moral theories until today, without simultaneously this same theory cancelling (negating, rescinding) itself (self-negating) as a theory. After at least two and a half thousand years of ethical and moral theories and ethical/moral failures, is it not now time for something like that to happen, if ethical/moral theory does not in actual fact constitute a power claim and ideology? Here is Rhodes, jump here! (= Prove what you can do here and now).³²

³² (Translator’s footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): “The phrase arises from the Latin form of Aesop’s Fables (Gibbs 209; Perry 33; Chambry 51), as translated from Ancient Greek “Αὐτοῦ γὰρ καὶ Ῥόδος καὶ πῆδημα” (literally) “Here is Rhodes, jump here!”. In the fable, a boastful athlete brags that he once achieved a

I (shall) bypass or circumvent Mr. Virvidakis's thoughts on the topic (theme, subject, matter) of the influence and of the intake or absorption of ideas, because I do not regard them as entirely incompatible (irreconcilable) with my views, but also because they are formulated and expressed digressively, without them being documented and proven/substantiated with historical examples so that their specific discussion is possible. I therefore come to a final problem of principle: the problem in respect of the practical consequences of a descriptive theory. I cannot not smile when seeing that, (yes) indeed, Mr. Georgiou considers that my descriptive theory of human affairs (matters, things) commands in practice the pursuit of power, whereas Mr. Virvidakis believes, conversely, that its logically necessary practical end, final point or conclusion is relinquishment (renouncement, abdication, abandonment, desisting, foregoing) of/from life and of action.³³ When all the commentators of a theory misapprehend (misunderstand, misconstrue) it in the same direction, then a part of the blame (responsibility) rests perhaps with the author's unclear formulations and expressions, which beget a certain impression with one only meaning. When, however, they misapprehend it in entirely different directions, then they themselves are probably to blame (responsible). In the case of both my critics, each and every respective content of the mistake/error differs, however, the source of the mistake (error) is common. Since they deny

stupendous long jump in competition on the island of Rhodes. A bystander challenges him to dispense with the reports of the witnesses and simply repeat his accomplishment on the spot: "Here is Rhodes, jump here!" Hic Rhodus, hic salta (Latin) = Prove what you can do, here and now."

(https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/hic_Rhodus,_hic_salta)

³³ (Translator's footnote. Absolutely nothing to do with P.K.): wherever it is indicated at www.panagiotiskondylis.com that absolutely consistent descriptive theory as practice would mean just sit where you are until you die, in one sense I have been wrong, because such theory doesn't even say that, as P.K. goes on to show. On the other hand, I am also "sort of, kind of" right in that since no course of action is proposed, just sitting there until one dies, is like a "default position", and normally wouldn't entail immediate or relatively quick death, anyway, as in the case of suicide. The point is though that whatever the absolutely consistent describer qua scientific observer of human affairs (scientist) does, he cannot completely remove himself from the common human-social world of survival and action (including the internal action of thinking) and just "sit in a state of pure science qua scientific observation", and that's why I've emphasised that it's one thing to engage in science absolutely strictly, and it's quite another thing, to use the scientific approach to strengthen one's arguments in favour of a particular normative course of action, in accordance e.g. with one's group's (perceived) interests, which is something most or nearly all people would (eventually) "instinctively" want to do, anyway.

recognising the descriptive character of my theory, they try, by ignoring central positions and analyses of mine, to draw from it (my theory) whatever one draws from normative theories, i.e. directions (in respect) of/for behaviour. Since, however, they draw or extract from my theory entirely different such directions, they involuntarily or unwillingly show what happens in reality: that from a descriptive theory you can infer or deduce whichever practical findings you want, for the simplest reason that theoretical description in itself is not in the least connected logically with findings of such a texture (composition, nature), which are and remain functions of existential decisions. From a toxicological manual, you can reap, extract or find directions to combat poisonings, and, directions for the commitment of a crime. From the axiologically free ([[non-normative]] value-free) description of man and of the world as deprived of objective—extra-subjective meaning, you can conclude that you ought to suicide, that nothing obstructs or hinders you from oppressing others, or that, simply because we do not have objective foundations to stand on – or objective support(s) (supporting structures) to get a hold of, we must feel (one of us) compassion and sympathy for the mortality and fragility of the other by thus developing an ethical (moral) stance like that which for instance Schopenhauer had in mind. All these, and still others, are possible and historically attested to and witnessed stances. Precisely for that reason, as I have already stressed (*loc. cit.*, p. 229), the only possible axiologically free (value-free) advice, i.e. the only such advice which does not contain any power claim on the part of the advisor, and consequently the only such advice in accordance with a descriptive theory, is: do whatever you want. Of course, on the basis of this advice it is not possible for a society to be constituted (formed, established) and to survive, for this, description does not take on that job (work, task), but normative thought and all those who interpret it bindingly take on that job. Description is, however, in practice, infertile, not because it logically leads to relinquishment (renouncement, abdication, abandonment, desisting, foregoing) and only

relinquishment, but, on the contrary, because it embraces inside its morphological, i.e. form-related/formal framework, the most different behaviours and practical stances, including also relinquishment, if someone prefers it. Descriptive theory does not, therefore, say *what* it will do or what whoever will read it must do; it says, however, how *whatever* it also does, it will fall within the suggested morphology (i.e. the study of forms (form-related/formal structure)), of the act and of the decision, if this morphology is correct. Relinquishment (Renouncement, Abdication, Abandonment, Desisting, Foregoing) as (an) Ought does not at all differ morphologically (i.e. in terms of form) from ethical and moral mobilisation, deployment or use (enlistment, partisanship or engagement) as (an) Ought; it differs only as to the content – but descriptive theory, since it does not itself make value judgements (evaluations) and does not appraise the preferences of every person, does not deal with the content(s), but only with the form of the decisions.

Beyond that, when Mr. Virvidakis considers relinquishment (renouncement, abdication, abandonment, desisting, foregoing) as the logically necessary practical consequence of a descriptive theory, he confuses the theoretical (dimension, element) with the social existence which necessarily interweaves with it (the theoretical (dimension)) in the same person. The theoretician (theorist), for as long as he remains at the level of description, cannot de facto, or from the state of reality, be mobilised (enlisted) or deployed in favour of one or another case; this he does at an entirely different level, that is, as a social existence, whose action, however, also again does not come into direct contradiction with [[normative]] theory, when it is subjected to it ([[normative]] theory) and constitutes its application. Contradiction can only exist between one/an ethical(moral)-normative theory and one/a practical behaviour (and it is known that such contradictions are most frequent in the circles of “moral (ethical) philosophers”); but contradiction between a description and a practical

behaviour is something by definition absurd. Ethicists or “moral (ethical) philosophers” most often try to rescind (negate, refute, confute) descriptive or “scepticist(ic)” positionings by using such arguments ad hominem and by confusing [[descriptive]] theoretical activity with the activity of the theoretician (theorist) as social existence. What is tasty, i.e. cute, charming or amusing (comic(al), funny), is that they most directly and thoroughly repel or beat off similar arguments (regarding theoretical activity as opposed to the theorist in his non-theoretical social life/existence) when others apply them (such arguments) to them (moral philosophers); if, however, they wanted to be consistent, they would have to accept that every personal ethical (moral) offence (misconduct or wrongdoing) of a “moral (ethical) philosopher” constitutes eo ipso and in itself a refutation and confutation of his ethical and moral theory. Do they dare, however, to accept that?

III

I said in the beginning that Messrs Georgiou and Virvidakis (Birbidakes), by repelling (rebuffing, refuting, repulsing, beating off) my theory on purpose (deliberately) and consciously, unwillingly (unintentionally) (without them wanting or intending) and de facto, confirm it. Because it is not possible for them to pit (counter or oppose my theory with) forms of thought (thought forms) different to those which the same (i.e. my theory) has described. I have shown that the thought of also the two of them (both) is governed or ruled by the classical and age-old (higgeldy-piggeldy) mixing of Being (Is) and Ought, which from the one or the other path (road) brings us back to Platonism and to theology, but with whatever form it might also appear, fulfils the same function: to convert subjective desires into a so-called objective world theory. Messrs Georgiou and Virvidakis imagine that because they talk of “rationalism” and

“ethics (morals, morality)”, they automatically surpass such contemptible or despicable things/matters (affairs) as are the “friend-foe” relation and power claims. Since here we are conducting a theoretical conversation, I am obliged to tell them that they err or are misguided with regard to a dire fallacy, even if at the level of practical behaviour I do not in the least desire to “enlighten” them, and to free (release) them from a fallacy which gives their life, meaning and a destination. Be that as it may: *every* ethics (morals, morality), and *every* ethical (moral) philosophy, is anchored inevitably in and fixedly or firmly (steadily) in a friend-foe relation, and it cannot exist but only on such a dichotomous basis. Because talk of ethics (morals, morality) is empty and superfluous without the dilation (expansion) of good and of evil (bad), of value and of anti-value, of what is preferred and of what is rejected, without their contrast(ing), and without the pursuit of the catholic (i.e. universal or general) imposition of the one, and of the catholic (i.e. universal or general) effacement or elimination (obliteration) of the other. And the matter (issue, thing) does not at all remain in the pale (sallow, washed out) territory of concepts and of arguments. The defence and protection of “good”, and the prosecution of “evil (bad)”, obtain vital interest and social meaning once they are connected, plausibly and naturally, besides, with the characterisation and the appraisal of the practical behaviour (i.e. behaviour in practice) of specific/concrete people, whereupon the dichotomy friend-foe moves on from the conceptual to the existential contrast(ing), or rather these two contrasts (the conceptual contrast(ing) and the existential contrast(ing) of good-evil, friend-foe) are fused in one and only one contrast. Here the power claim comes up pressingly, compulsively and inevitably. Because just as ethics (morals, morality) cannot exist without the dichotomy of friend-foe, that is of “good” and of “evil (bad)”, thus it (ethics) cannot also exist but only as the demand of/for the conformation/conforming of behaviour to the commands of the “good”. But what else is – from/of its nature – a power claim if not a demand addressed to people (humans) so that they

behave in this or such a manner, and not otherwise or differently? And like the ethical (moral) dichotomy of “good-evil(bad)”, so too the ethical (moral) power claim is automatically connected with a specific/concrete (individual or collective) existential bearer. No-one has ever seen Reason (Logos) and Ethics (Morals, Morality) appearing as a harmonic pair and proclaiming in person (personally) to people their wills and volitions. Just as the wills/volitions of God, so too the wills and volitions of Reason and of Ethics reach (arrive) (up to) people through (by means/way of) other people, who profess (insist, claim) that they know and are aware of them (the volitions of Reason and of Ethics), and represent them authentically in pursuing for themselves the decisive monopoly of interpretation. Of course, as a rule they support that the commands of Reason and of Ethics are objectively given, and not the products of subjective wishes or desires, however they claim and contend this objectivity provided (under/with the precondition or presupposition) that their interpretation is considered as the valid interpretation; no-one ever said that (yes) indeed ethical (moral) commands are objectively given, nevertheless they have the meaning which someone else gives them and not he himself (i.e. the person initially saying that ethical commands are objectively given). This game belongs to the older/oldest games under the sun, and one easily sees into it if one does not personally live (very frugally and poorly in a state of depravation) off/from that – or if all respective others (other people) play it [[and not the person seeing into the said game]]. Nevertheless, it is not bound to stop. Thus, Mr. Virvidakis talks of “the *legitimate* explanatory and regulatory role of axiological (value-related) concepts”, as if the definition of the legitimate is the most self-evident thing in the world, as if all people (everyone) has in (their) mind(s) the same things and the same persons when hearing this word (“legitimate”), as if for thousands of years rivers of blood have not been spilt or do not flow in order to judge who will bindingly define what is legitimate and what is not. I ask or beseech the reader to believe that not any kind of opprobrious or abusive disposition

whatsoever, but rather the need for precision (precise talk), pushes or drives me to characterise this usual stance of “moral (ethical) philosophers”, stupid (obtuse, dense) but also cunning (sly, sneaky, conniving), and not essentially different from the stance of politicians and of third-rate (wannabe) politicians, who, also, ceaselessly invoke the common good (general interest) by keeping/holding for themselves the monopoly of its (the common good’s) interpretation. From a theoretical point of view, stupid is anyone who cannot see that the legitimate and the illegitimate do not exist and do not act as self-existing, self-sufficient, autonomous (independent) entities, but rather only inside the interpretation of concrete/specific subjects; and cunning is whoever uses this onticisation of concepts as a cover or veil (acting as a guise (pretext, pretence)) in order to create the impression that concepts cannot have any other hypostasis (existence) apart from that which one’s own interpretation attaches to it. But, also, being stupid – albeit simultaneously cunning as well – has, i.e. shows or brings about, only temporary and partial results; because many sides do the same (thing) concurrently, and the vicious circle is perpetuated.

Whilst making these rather bothersome and annoying observations about “rationalists” and “moral (ethical) philosophers”, I start, at last, to sense the solution of an aporia or query which came into being (was begot/born) for/to me when reading the texts of Messrs Georgiou and Virvidakis. And both attribute my analyses regarding the texture, composition or nature of ethical(moral)-normative thought to some “rejective (dismissive, rebuffing, negating)” disposition and or “enmity”. This seemed to me to be paradoxical, because I do not understand well what kind of enmity one can foster or feed vis-à-vis a thought in regard to which one expressly says that it has taken root in fixed or firm (steady) anthropological and cultural (civilisational) factors, and that at the level of social activity, it (i.e. normative thought) cannot be replaced by any other, irrespective of what observers say in their study-rooms (library reading

rooms, etc.) [[i.e. in this case, P.K. and his descriptive theory]]; if I were inimical and hostile towards this (normative) thought, if I wanted, i.e. to get it out of the way and eliminate it, I would have to seek the effacement (obliteration, elimination) of the human genus (species, race) (mankind), but I cannot see how I can do that without proclaiming destruction as a new Ought. Something else, therefore, I think bothers Messrs Georgiou and Virvidakis deep down. I leave, of course, to ethics (morals, morality) and to “moral (ethical) philosophers”, the field of social action (the social act), but by analysing the mechanisms with which they possess and exploit it (the said field of social action), I deprive them of something at least equally important: I doubt that they are those who they claim or contend to be, and I doubt that their action will have the results which they themselves claim or contend will have. Because our foe usually seems to be that person who does not share our self-understanding, but sees us in a light less favourable than whatever (light) we see ourselves (in); that is why also in regard to various “moral (ethical) philosophers” etc., it is not possible for them to not apprehend or perceive a descriptive theory like mine as the product and indication of enmity; how can they accept that they are characterised and inspired by very common and very-very human power claims, people who directly or indirectly consider themselves to be the salt and hope of the earth? In regard to such, very crucial matters, today’s “rationalists” are equally as sensitive and tenacious (uncompromising, adamant, defiant) as were also theologians (theologists) in their golden epochs (eras, ages). Nevertheless, not only a (my) sense of humour obstructs (hampers, impedes, bothers, prevents) me from sharing their self-understanding. Even more significant is a very gross (crude) and absolutely indisputable historical fact. A great many times until today, in the name of ethical (moral) ideas and values, people (humans) were oppressed and exterminated (annihilated, extirpated, killed off), individually and as/in groups (collectively). How would this have been possible if such ideas and values were not from their birth (by birth, congenitally) power claims?

As “rationalists”, Messrs Georgiou and Virvidakis face similar questions with (the use of)/in two ways, one direct and one indirect. The direct way rests or is based on the full (total, complete) ignorance of history and on the relinquishment (renouncement, abdication, abandonment, desisting, foregoing) of/from every effort at the interpretation of historical experience (empirical reality). By ignoring history, “correct” Reason (Logos) is contradistinguished to this (history), and at the same time is satisfied coquettishly in itself. I fear, nonetheless, that, if we contradistinguish Reason with history, then we would not have to choose between Reason and history (whereupon I do not see why we should not prefer Reason), but rather we would have to choose between history and the Reason of Messrs Georgiou and Virvidakis: because Reason exists only in the interpretation of all its respective representatives, and they, as is known, not only have not managed to convince everyone that Reason is the highest (most supreme) and more desirable good, but they have not even between them ended up in agreement about what Reason is, and what it ordains every time; I am certain that if Messrs Georgiou and Virvidakis were discussing [[matters]] at length and in depth (thoroughly, exhaustively), and with the help of Reason, sought solutions to specific (concrete) problems, very quickly would they forget their polemical alliance against me and they would see their disagreements multiply, without the common invocation of Reason bringing them closer together – except if they are now intellectual(-spiritual) twins. Indirectly, again, the overwhelming, crushing weight of historical testimonies is confronted [[on the part of those who invoke a version of Reason]] with the confession of failure of previous ethical (moral) theories, as this, for instance, is echoed in the undertakings of rephrasing (reformulation or reworking) and improvement of moral (ethical) philosophy; this is what Mr. Virvidakis means for instance when he talks of liberation from the anthropocentrisms of the past. Of course, belief that with the remaking of theories, the world is remade, is a favourite of, and beloved by, theoreticians (theorists), who thus automatically become world-

composition (nature) of specific, concrete human existences inside specific, concrete situations. Ideas do not exist. Humans exist. Of course, amongst humans, some contend or claim that ideas exist and not humans, or that binding ideas, just like Reason (Logos), must substitute, i.e. be a substitute for and replace the arbitrariness of humans. But also, again: only humans can contend (claim) something like that.